New Air Command Accident Analysis Report

DennisFetters

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No horizontal stab needed.
Over many years, there have been people inside and outside of the forum that have been spreading misleading information concerning the accent rate of the Air Command gyroplanes. They throw numbers around without the facts behind them, intentionally trying to mislead people into a false conclusion that the Commander gyroplanes were dangerous and deadly to anyone flying them. When people do this, they are misleading you, in fact, it’s the same as lying to you.

What do you think about a person that is trying to intentionally mislead you by not presenting the full facts? I won’t ever stand for it, and why should you? If these people have mislead you all these years about one thing, then what else have they not been completely honest about?

In my constant effort to correct history, I have went through every listed death involved in a Commander gyroplane on the FAA data base, and created a summarized report as to the pertinent information involved in each of the 25 cases listed, and the circumstances behind as to why the pilot crashed. After all, there is a big difference between an aircraft that crashes due to poor flying characteristics, and aircraft that were flown by unqualified people with inadequate training, or even no training at all.

This reports shows the following pertinent information of the pilots competence level, and it forms an unquestionable pattern that none of these 25 events were the fault of the aircraft whatsoever, and all could have been avoided if just basic gyroplane trading would have been completed, except in two cases where the pilots crashed during incapacitation from heart attacks, and one case where the pilot was incapacitated from ice buildup over his eyes and face.

I typed this report by hand, so if anyone finds an error, or knows of other accidents that can be added, or can add additional information to any of these events, please contact me. Here is a summery breakdown of the pilot competence in the 25 reports;

  • How many of the pilots were Rotorcraft Rated:................None
  • How many of the pilots are confirmed no training:.............7of 25
  • How many of the pilots may not have had training:...........10 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had less than 1 hours training:......1 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had less than 2 hours training;......3 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had less than 3 hours training;......2 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had less than 5 hours training;......2 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had less than 6 hours training;......2 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had less than 8 hours training;......1 of 25
  • How many of the pilots had more than 8 hours training;.....0 of 25
  • How many of the pilots were killed for other reasons;........3 of 25
The highest time pilot had 23 total hours in type, and was killed showing off beyond his ability during a sales demonstration. This list indicates that as many as 17 out of these 25 pilots probably didn't have any training.

As you can see, the pattern is clear. None of these people had enough training, or no training at all. It would not have mattered if they were flying a HCLT or CLT, they simply did not have enough experience to be flying any type of rotorcraft. I have looked at the few accident reports out of the U.K and Italy, and all fall into the same category as above.

An important factor is to remember when I owned Air Command; we were selling 97% of all gyroplanes being manufactured at the time, which was also an 80% increase of gyroplanes being put into the realm of aviation. It was only natural that the gyroplane accident rate would rise with this 80% increase of gyroplane activity, and accidents had greater odds of being a Commander simply due to our overwhelming dominance of the market.

Today’s gyroplane accident rate had decreased mainly due to around an 85% decrease of gyroplane activity since I left the market.

For those that require the full account of each event listed, you can go the following FAA link and search with the date and location: https://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp

I know that to some people these inconvenient facts go against what they want to believe about the Commander Gyroplane, but more importantly, they go against what they want YOU to believe about the Commander Gyroplane. But facts are facts, and reasonable people will see that.

Air Command FAA Accident Analysis Summery Report;

Report #1;
Name:.....................Joseph R. Benjamin
Date:......................06/26/2005
Location:.................Highgate, VT
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........NONE
Total Hours in Type:...First flight.
Winds:.....................7
Cause of Accident: ....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.
***************

Report #2;
Name:.....................Arthur Vernon Close
Date:......................12/03/2004
Location:.................Wilmont, OH
Killed:......................2
Type:......................532 Commander Two-Place SXS
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:...UNKNOWN
Winds:.....................8
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to avoid power lines.
***************

Report #3;
Name:.....................James F. Gear
Date:......................01/01/2003
Location:.................Lansing, IL
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:..UNKNOWN
Winds:....................16 gusts to 21
Cause of Accident:....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training. Factor to the
.............................accident was the wind gusts.
***************

Report #4;
Name:.....................Anthony Spagnoletti
Date:......................09/12/1999
Location:.................Conroe, TX
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................582 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:.10 (Not flown one year prior to accident)
Winds:...................Calm
Cause of Accident:...Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #5;
Name:.....................Gary Falen
Date:......................06/12/1994
Location:.................Georgetown, OH
Killed:......................1
Type:......................503 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........NONE
Total Hours in Type:..8
Winds: Calm
Cause of Accident: ....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #6;
Name:.....................John Rains
Date:......................09/26/1992
Location:.................Eureka, CA
Killed:......................2
Type:......................532 Commander Two-Place SXS
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........2
Total Hours in Type:...5
Winds:.....................5
Cause of Accident: .....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #7;
Name:.....................Barney Schmidt
Date:......................08/29/1992
Location:.................Dumas, TX
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........NONE
Total Hours in Type:.2
Winds:...................5
Cause of Accident:...Pilot's failure to acquire proper training. Factor to the
............................accident was 6600 density altitude.

Report #8;
Name:.....................Royce R. Rutter
Date:......................05/31/1992
Location:.................Washburn, IA
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........3
Total Hours in Type:...7
Winds:.....................7
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #9;
Name:.....................Garry A. Lindsey
Date:......................08/04/1991
Location:.................Libby, MT
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........NONE
Total Hours in Type:...NONE (First flight)
Winds:.....................Calm
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #10;
Name:.....................Donald R. Lee
Date:......................07/13/1991
Location:.................Quitman, MS
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........NONE
Total Hours in Type:..5
Winds:....................3
Cause of Accident:....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #11;
Name:.....................Charles R. May
Date:......................01/15/1991
Location:.................Tomahawk, WI
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................503 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....UNKNOWN
Training Time:..........NONE
Total Hours in Type:.12
Winds:...................2
Cause of Accident:...Factor to the accident pilot loss of control, had no
............................goggles and had ¼” of ice buildup over his eyes and
............................face after ground impact.

Report #12;
Name:.....................Robert Lewis Demarco
Date:......................04/07/1990
Location:.................Okeechobee, FL
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........15 minutes
Total Hours in Type:..1
Winds: Calm
Cause of Accident:....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #13;
Name:.....................Carl E. Hittle
Date:......................04/07/1990
Location:.................El Paso, TX
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........2
Total Hours in Type:..2.1 (First flight solo, not flown 6 months after training)
Winds:....................6
Cause of Accident:....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #14;
Name:.....................Guerra Oscar J, Jr.
Date:......................02/17/1990
Location:.................Hearne, TX
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................447 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........6.5
Total Hours in Type:..7 (First solo flight)
Winds:....................Calm
Cause of Accident:....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #15;
Name:.....................Julian A. Sheimo
Date:......................01/22/1990
Location:.................Munster, IN
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:..13
Winds:....................12
Cause of Accident:....Pilot making advanced maneuvers showing off beyond
.............................his ability.

Report #16;
Name:.....................Preston E. Stanger
Date:......................01/11/1990
Location:.................Hansen, ID
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:..23
Winds:....................8
Cause of Accident:....Pilot making advanced maneuvers showing off beyond
.............................his ability for sales demo flight, made abrupt right turn
.............................to low and impacted ground.

Report #17;
Name:.....................William E. Fifer
Date:......................11/13/1988
Location:.................Sullivan, IL
Killed:......................1
Type:......................503 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........6
Total Hours in Type:...6 (First flight solo, not flown 4 months after training)
Winds:.....................12
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #18;
Name:.....................William A. Cameron
Date:......................10/14/1988
Location:.................Hixson, TN
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:...4 (First flight solo, not flown 4 months after training)
Winds:.....................Calm
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #19;
Name:.....................Robert M. Heibel
Date:......................09/21/1988
Location:.................Cottage Grove, WI
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander Two-Place SXS
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........3
Total Hours in Type:...8
Winds:.....................8
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training, and pilots
..............................failure to meet the manufacturers requirement to have
..............................a minimum of 50 hours in type before attempt to fly
..............................532 Commander Two-Place solo.

Report #20;
Name:.....................Robert L. Glens
Date:......................07/23/1988
Location:.................Baytown, TX
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:...5
Winds: 4
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #21;
Name:.....................Jerome Lamb
Date:......................11/04/1987
Location:.................Meriden, CT
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........8
Total Hours in Type:...9
Winds:.....................9
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training, and failure to
..............................control aircraft.

Report #22;
Name:.....................John L. Watts, SR.
Date:......................07/27/1987
Location:.................Davenport, IA
Killed;......................1
Type:......................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:...13
Winds:.....................18 gusting to 26
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training, and flying in
..............................high winds beyond his ability.

Report #23;
Name:.....................Kenneth Ray Crews
Date:......................06/28/1987
Location:.................St. Francisville, LA
Killed:......................1
Type:......................532 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:...21
Winds:.....................7
Cause of Accident:.....Suffered heart attack during flight, and lost control.

Report #24;
Name:.....................David P. Langr
Date:......................05/15/1988
Location:.................Dodge Center
Killed:......................1
Type:......................447 Commander
Rotorcraft Rating:......NONE
Training Time:...........NONE
Total Hours in Type:...5
Winds:.....................12
Cause of Accident:.....Pilot's failure to acquire proper training.

Report #25;
Name:.....................Wilter C. Samuels
Date:......................02/01/1987
Location:.................Paducah. KY
Killed:.....................1
Type:.....................532 Commander Elite
Rotorcraft Rating:.....NONE
Training Time:..........UNKNOWN
Total Hours in Type:..5
Winds:....................7
Cause of Accident:....Suffered heart attack during flight, and lost control.

I have always been very upfront about the dangers involved with maintaining, flying and obtaining proper training. Attached here is some of the warnings that was in my assembly manuals. I have always made proper training a top priority, as you can see. Even though, people would still ignore even the harshest of warnings and the result is an accident or one waiting to happen.

There is much more to flying than learning to control an aircraft. Training is not just to show you how to control the vehicle; it is also about learning how the vehicle works, and why it works. Training is also to teach you to safely operate within the aviation community with other aircraft. It is an essential part of safe flying, and necessary for every type of aircraft.

Remember; Man is a two dimensional creature, while flying is a three dimensional task, of which man must learn.

.
 

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Last edited:
Of course, Dennis. You’re the victim of a conspiracy; these guys all went out and killed themselves just to sully your good name.

Untrained and partially trained pilots wouldn’t think of getting into any gyro other than a Fetters “Classic”.

That’s the reason other brands of gyros have a much better safety record. Poor Dennis.
 
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Dennis you missed one. I think it was called an ultralight so it may not have made the NTSB reports.

Dave Geboy.
Hartford, Wisconsin.
Older style Air Command w/o horiz stab.

He had previous gyro experience but this was his first flight in this ship. His other gyro was an Air Command with a pod and stab. Not sure how many hours he had in it. But he did fly at the Mentone convention.

Witness stated Dave told him he was only going to fly the runway to get familiar with the new gyro. Witness then stated instead he took off and was flying the pattern. Seemed to PPO 150-200' over the runway flipped and crashed.
 
Ive said this once and I'll say it again--Im not fond of his business practices BUT he wrote one hell of a manual --he STATED that this gyro WOULD KILL YOU --WITHOUT PROPER TRAINING--give the man credit --
 
Dennis you missed one. I think it was called an ultralight so it may not have made the NTSB reports.

Dave Geboy.
Hartford, Wisconsin.
Older style Air Command w/o horiz stab.

He had previous gyro experience but this was his first flight in this ship. His other gyro was an Air Command with a pod and stab. Not sure how many hours he had in it. But he did fly at the Mentone convention.

Witness stated Dave told him he was only going to fly the runway to get familiar with the new gyro. Witness then stated instead he took off and was flying the pattern. Seemed to PPO 150-200' over the runway flipped and crashed.

Please send me any links so that I may find out the facts.
 
Of course, Dennis. You’re the victim of a conspiracy; these guys all went out and killed themselves just to sully your good name.
Untrained and partially trained pilots wouldn’t think of getting into any gyro other than a Fetters “Classic”.
That’s the reason other brands of gyros have a much better safety record. Poor Dennis.

You know, I don't do baby talk.
 
Dennis does not need me to come to hid rescue but from what I can see from the FAA reports over the few years I have been researching gyros in the intrest of flying. There has been an accident in almost every type of gyro out there, Bensen, KB, Gyrobee, RAF the only one I could not find any accident reports for was Martin Hollmanns BumbleBee but that may just be cause it's and UL. Mr. Hollmann told me there has never been a reported accident involving this aircraft either that he knows of.

So whats the deal, I do not know Dennis but sur do hear alot of bad stuff about the guy. What I do know is that he has designed several types of aircraft over the years and the Aircommand from the ones I know that own them like them very much. He is also desgning UAV for the miltary so he must know his stuff to even do that.

Am I missing something here?
Dan
 
Of course, Dennis. You’re the victim of a conspiracy; these guys all went out and killed themselves just to sully your good name.

Untrained and partially trained pilots wouldn’t think of getting into any gyro other than a Fetters “Classic”.

That’s the reason other brands of gyros have a much better safety record. Poor Dennis.

I don't know, it sure looks like a lot of people with little or no training!
It's easy to blame the machine, harder to blame the deceased, it's against our nature.
Dave
 
Yep this guy has also been getting hammered over the Mini 500. Every machine out there has fualts and the first and main one to look at is the one flying it. From the FAA reports I will plan on getting even more training than I was planning.
 
As you can see, the pattern is clear. None of these people had enough training, or no training at all. It would not have mattered if they were flying a HCLT or CLT, they simply did not have enough experience to be flying any type of rotorcraft. .

Dennis,

While I completely agree that people with little or no training should not be flying gyros (or any aircraft for that matter). I disagree with your statement that HTL or CLT would not have mattered.

First of all HTL is ok so long as the machine is adequately stabilized.

Second of all, it make perfect sense that FW and low-time pilots are going to be the most susceptible to PIO (and therefore PPO).

To me this report simply confirms that the classic commanders are quite easy to PPO and had they been PIO/PPO resistant many of these people would be alive and here today. Especially, those with at least a couple of hours of training or those that had FW training but new to gyros.

That said...

No one should fault you for building an "80's gyro" in the 1980's.

You have been and should be rightfully commended for both your warnings to customers in your manuals and your popularization of the sport.

The issue I have with your statements, is when you make claims that the 'classic commanders' are just as safe, stable and PIO/PPO resistant as CLT and Dynamically Stable HTL machines.

That is where I feel you are undoing your past efforts of warning the nubee gyro pilots and potentially risking lives needlessly.

I am heartened by your stated position of recommending Stable/CLT gyros to new pilots but I feel many of your statements about your flying and the performance of the classic commanders gives a terribly mixed signal.

You are regarded by some as an authority figure and with that comes the responsibly to take the high road and be perfectly clear and honest about the dangers of PIO/PPO. Much like the progressive attitude toward safety you took in the past.

my 2 cents.

.
 
Why, with dual instruction unavailable during most of its production life, would the Bensen B-8 apparently have had about ½ the fatality rate of Air Command “Classics”?*

Make--------------------FAA registry------------NTSB fatalities-----%

BENSEN--------------------1608--------------------83---------------5.2

AIRCOMMAND “CLASSIC”--250--------------------25---------------10

The factory stock Bensen B-8 with steel industrial wheels and a steel outboard fuel tank was LTL by several inches but nothing near a “Classic” with a 5’ propeller and an inverted Rotax with gearbox turned up. With lightweight wheels and a seat tank, a B-8 is almost exactly CLT and with the addition of a proper horizontal stabilizer would match the most stable gyro now available.

‘Classics” were viciously unstable vs. angle of attack, pitching nose up in an upward gust and nose down in a downward gust, compounding the disturbance. Stable aircraft always head into the relative wind.

Why would anyone have mounted a Rotax upside down?

Aside from exacerbating the CG problem, the design of the main bearing lubrication scheme is defeated; there are catch troughs under the cylinder transfer passages that feed condensed oil to the main bearings via drilled passages.

Oil collects in the spark plugs and causes fouling and hard starting.

With water cooled Rotax engines, there are blind pockets in the water jackets that collect air and various gasses that are normally dissolved in the water and cause overheating. Water jacket blind pockets need to be vented from their high points to a header tank; otherwise, purging is virtually impossible and even if successful, it won’t stay purged very long.

*The FAA/NTSB records aren’t much to hang one’s hat on but nothing better is available. Such errors as contained in the records should be random and affect all makes equally.

The first fatality in a Cierva type Autogiro occurred after 33,000 hours of flight time had been accumulated while the US FW fatality rate in 1939 was 1 per 5,000 hours, according to Peter W. Brooks in “Cierva Autogiros.” Perhaps the pilots were better in the 1930s but without question the designers were. Real engineers vs. eyeball engineers (or more accurately; stylists).
 
Tim, thank you for your opinion, and I respect them. I meant this thread to be about the Air Command accident record and the myths behind what some others have falsely represented it to be. I hope that it will not turn into another CLT verses HCLT debate, but I will most certainly answer you post, with pleasure;

Dennis,
While I completely agree that people with little or no training should not be flying gyros (or any aircraft for that matter). I disagree with your statement that HTL or CLT would not have mattered.
First of all HTL is ok so long as the machine is adequately stabilized.
Second of all, it make perfect sense that FW and low-time pilots are going to be the most susceptible to PIO (and therefore PPO).
To me this report simply confirms that the classic commanders are quite easy to PPO and had they been PIO/PPO resistant many of these people would be alive and here today. Especially, those with at least a couple of hours of training or those that had FW training but new to gyros).

I said it would not have mattered if they were flying a CLT of HCLT gyroplane because in each event none of these people had enough training to safely fly any type of aircraft, let alone a rotorcraft where your flight control surfaces are traveling 280mph.

What aircraft equal to the performance of even the wimpiest gyro would you say someone would not have crashed if they were trying to fly it with zero training? Or with 2 hours of training? Or even 5 or 8 hours? There are none, is the answer. A CLT gyroplane is a killer in the wrong hands, as it has also proved to be.

If I took these same reports and replaced the aircraft type with any other aircraft, like a Cessna 150, or an ultralight, anyone looking at the report afterwords would not even question or be surprised of the results. Do you not agree? A CLT gyro is an advanced rotorcraft witch requires skills to fly. The only way to achieve those skills is through training.

Definitely 7 of the people on this report had no training. 10 more probably had no training. That is 17 out of 25. The rest were still low time pilots without adequate training, no matter what they would have been flying.

That said...
No one should fault you for building an "80's gyro" in the 1980's. You have been and should be rightfully commended for both your warnings to customers in your manuals and your popularization of the sport.

Well, you and I know they do. I have been called a murderer, and the Kevorkian of rotorcraft, and worse. There has even been debates here on the forum if I designed aircraft just to intentionally kill people. I have endured more than a man should, and unfairly so, and all because some people lied about my aircrafts record, some intentionally and some just repeating what they heard others say. All the more reason to get the facts presented so people with open minds can know the truth.

I want no rewards, just the truth to be recognized. Right here on this very thread Chuck Beaty is going ape-s**t doing damage control just to try and keep that credit from me, and for his purpose of doing this, I do not know. He is willing to lie and deceive anyone he can, even to the point of making himself obvious in his idiotic efforts.

The issue I have with your statements, is when you make claims that the 'classic commanders' are just as safe, stable and PIO/PPO resistant as CLT and Dynamically Stable HTL machines.
That is where I feel you are undoing your past efforts of warning the nubee gyro pilots and potentially risking lives needlessly.
I am heartened by your stated position of recommending Stable/CLT gyros to new pilots but I feel many of your statements about your flying and the performance of the classic commanders gives a terribly mixed signal.

I say the classic Commander is as safe as a CLT because time has proved that a fact. We can not ignore that thousands of people have safely flown HCLT gyroplanes all over the world for the past 60 years, even to this day. Like any aircraft, it requires training to fly safely. Yes, it may even require more training than in a CLT, but thats not the point. I stand by the fact that a HCLT gyroplane is just as safe to fly as a CLT, so long as you have the proper training in either aircraft, however much that takes.

An HCLT gyroplane has some different characteristic than a CLT, and with the proper training, you can safely fly that HCLT gyroplane in any condition you can a CLT, providing pilot experience is met.

I know it's not the same, but I will use this as an example only; A tail dragger airplane has different characteristics than a tri-gear, and requires proper training, and maybe more than a Tri-gear, but can be flown as safely as a Tri-gear. So now we have tri-gears, and because it requires a little more skill and training and may ground loop the dragger means that they are now dangerous and the designers all must be chastised, tar and feathered and run out of town? I don't need someone coming here and being a smart-ass, because you can be killed in a tail dragger if you ground-loop it, it's and example only to describe that some aircraft have different characteristics than others, not meant to compare the risks in a gyro.

You see, I believe you are the one sending the mixed signals, and I see it is you undoing all the good things accomplished from the past through the teachings of misconception.

I have said it before, you make it should like the CLT gyroplane is so safe you need no training, because it will just save your life in the event of a problem. The signals I am trying to say is simple. Don't condemn aircraft that have proved to fly safely for so many years just because they are HCLT. Teach the new people the truth, and not a bunch of hyped up hysteria. Teach them the real differences and how to overcome those differences, so they learn the real reasons and differences, so that the future will breed new pilots and designers that use common since to design, and not just voodoo to do it some way or another, simply because we said so....

You are regarded by some as an authority figure and with that comes the responsibly to take the high road and be perfectly clear and honest about the dangers of PIO/PPO. Much like the progressive attitude toward safety you took in the past. my 2 cents.

There is no aircraft ever built that can not be improved as we learn from the past. But that does not say that the aircraft from that past are obsolete yet. There are many used HCLT out there that some guy could pick up at good prices. I say again, you are sending them mixed signals when you tell them that aircraft is a deathtrap unless you spend thousands of dollars and convert it to CLT. Those people are not stupid, and they seen or remember the past, and they find out that those aircraft flew really good back then, and its the same atmosphere here today, so it should fly the same, which is good enough for him. Now that person will not believe anything you say, because he found out otherwise, so how can you expect him to pay attention to you to make sure he gets the good advice later?

What we need to be doing is being truthful. That guy is going to buy that used aircraft anyway, so what we need to do is stop waisting efforts trying to pull the wool over his eyes and start showing him the way to safely operate that machine through proper training. Better that, then for him to blow his last nickel on converting it, and then can't afford the training, which leads to a disaster that helps none of us.

That's my 2 cents, and I hope I have made my point clear to you and others that read this. You may not agree with it all, your prerogative, but I hope at least you understand my view. And I hope not to get into a debate over HCLT and CLT, because I won't.
 
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In the accident reports would the FAA consider anyone who was self-taught to have no instruction no matter how many years they'd been flying?
 
That's my 2 cents, and I hope I have made my point clear to you and others that read this. You may not agree with it all, your prerogative, but I hope at least you understand my view. And I hope not to get into a debate over HCLT and CLT, because I won't.

I think I do understand your view and in general terms I agree.

I also agree there is no need to go into CLT/HTL comparison unless some misstatement is made about the design and physics of these concepts.

I would however, very much like to point out, that I agree with your statement only to the extent that you would be referring to a dynamically pitch stable HTL machine.

If in your examples we assume the HTL machine (or even CLT machine) is dynamically pitch unstable than I strongly disagree with some of the statements in your post.

I am not qualified to describe the pitch dynamics of the classic commanders. Nor do I know the results of a double-hang test on a classic commander or commanders with various AirCommand options (external fuel tanks, pods, the stock hstab ) or even worse 3rd party and owner modifications. But there are people here on the forum that are qualified to do so.

I don't know, but I suspect that you give the classic commanders more credit for stability then they deserve, through no fault of your own but "because you are too close to the trees to see the forest".

You have more experience with these machines (commanders) then anyone on the planet. You have built and flown more of them than anyone. Your uncousious nervous system can likely fly an entire circuit without bothering your conscious brain. I feel it is that very over-experience that is working against your critique of the machines pitch stability.

I dearly loved my 447 commander. I have never had as much fun in any gyro, than that machine. I wish I had one in my hangar right now ( but with a 503 or 582 if you know what I mean). However, the first thing I would do after acquiring another classic commander would be to modify it so that it was dynamically pitch stable and highly PIO/PPO resistant.

With a PIO/PPO resistant commander I could make all of the same great nimble maneuvers but without the danger of making a mistake that would take my life in a PPO.

I do not forget, what does not get mentioned enough, that I had a STOCK Air Command horiztonal stabliser on my machine. Nor I have heard you ever tell anyone that an hstab is a detriment in any way.
 
What I find interesting is that none of the listed pilots had more than 23 hours of total time in type. This would suggest one of 2 conclusions:

  1. After about 25 hours in type, pilots become immune to PIO/PPO accidents
  2. After about 25 hours in type, pilots stop flying this aircraft

I am sure the reality is a combination of both, nobody really knows. How many pilots on this forum have more than 25 hours in the original no-stab Fetters A/C (other than Dennis, please... anyone?) One of these pilots is Doug Riley (sorry to drag you into this, Doug). If I remember correctly, Doug reported that even with a lot of air time under his belt, his A/C would scare him when he was flying fast in bumpy weather. Is that because Doug is an inferior pilot? No, I think that after 25 hours in type pilots learn to recognize the limits of their aircraft and avoid the danger zones. Pilots with less than 25 hours don't know any better and, due to lack of experience (not necessarily training), put themselves in situations they can't handle. Some were lucky to survive, and some were not.

No aircraft is fool proof and you have got to be an idiot to fly anything without training. But -- every pilot has to go through the learning curve of flying his ship solo. Every pilot needs to gain experience in order to minimize risk. I know I have made some mistakes as a new pilot. The odds for survival during this period of getting solo experience improve dramatically if you fly a more forgiving gyro, and this is the bottom line! Someone once said - you don't deserve to die just because you made a mistake. I personally like the challenge of handling machines that are difficult to master but, as a hobby pilot with 3 kids and a wife who depend on me for their welfare, it would be absolutely dumb on my part to fly anything that would punish me by death for being inexperienced. Why shouldn't I stack the odds in my favor? This choice was not obvious 20 years ago, and I don't blame Dennis or anyone for this. But today, the choice is known.

Udi
 
This choice was not obvious 20 years ago, and I don't blame Dennis or anyone for this. But today, the choice is known.

I typed for about 30 minutes and you said it with so few words. Thanks Udi.
 
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