Fatal - AutoGyro MTOSport D-MTMZ, near Hildesheim airfield, Germany 21 JUL 2021

[TyroGyro]

Terrible, ideed.
The autogyro was optically in a neat condition. The high number of operating hours could not be seen from the seat cushions, the joysticks or any other traces.

It seems they took care to make sure it looked good, cosmetically, but yet never took a look at the most important components...

The affected autogyro had a comparatively high total operating time. Due to the permanent use as a training device, it is very likely that an exceptionally high number of take-offs and landings, with corresponding speed changes in the rotor system, were carried out.
Due to the unladen weight of the autogyro and the masses of the occupants, it was constantly operated above the maximum permissible operating mass during training...
It was only possible to find out that the operating hours counter had been changed and that the actual total operating time was approx. 3,940 hours by looking at old on-board documents from before 2018. The operating hour counter in the cockpit and the operating time noted in the onboard documents gave a student pilot a completely wrong impression of the total operating time of the gyroplane, the age and the wear and tear of the components.

The poor student had no idea he was getting into a deathtrap.

Pick your engineer wisely. I have met some who simply should not be anywhere near an aircraft, especially YOUR aircraft.

A full-blown psychiatric case, in one instance, on medication, unable to sleep, haunted forever by terrible things he had done in another life, in a war on another continent... The killing of children, to be exact.

When he told me his guns had been taken off him by the Police, because his medication was on the prohibited list, I knew it was time to depart...

Threats to my aircraft, to throw it off the airfield in the pouring rain and leave it on the highway - or tow it without my permission and dump it at another random airfield. Attempted extortion. And a literal tug-of-war going on over my aircraft, while I am sitting, helpless, over 60 miles away...

I have seen it all. People who should be nowhere near aviation, but who still are, and working on others' aircraft.

 

[Philbennett]

Its a personal view but I think this accident report should raise a lot of questions in the UK and other territories that follow the UK process.

First of all the German authorities are now happy to claim the rotors are prone to cracking that seems to reference the Cranfield report on MT-03 blade integrity. My point being that perhaps the increased inspection regime required now could have been demanded earlier.

Secondly the MTOW of 450kgs is suggested that the aircraft was being flown overweight to the detriment to the integrity of the aircraft. In the UK the MTOW is 500kgs and yet the rotor life is the same. Why?

 

[Andino]

Any AG flying with 4,000 hour rotor blades is indeed a "deathtrap" as Tyger accused. I now question the replacement of that gyro's hourly meter as possibly more fraudulent vs. maintenance, i.e., a facelift on a dowager to fool young suitors.

Any institution tends to be a lengthened shadow of its founders or current dynamic leaders. The particular flippancy of Thomas Kiggen, one of the three founders, in not regularly removing his rotor blades for required inspections (with falsified maintenance records, no doubt), as well as apparently not attaching his safety belt illuminates the corporate arrogance of AG in general as the "market leader." If Kiggen so grotesquely cut safety corners on his own gyro, what does that betoken for AG in general?

Oh, and where is AG's "university study" on their Rotor System II's alleged 2,500 hour service life? I wonder if it ever existed at all.

 

[DavePA11]

Tyrogyro - make sure you tell us how to avoid that one please.

 

[Philbennett]

Any AG flying with 4,000 hour rotor blades is indeed a "deathtrap" as Tyger accused. I now question the replacement of that gyro's hourly meter as possibly more fraudulent vs. maintenance, i.e., a facelift on a dowager to fool young suitors.

Any institution tends to be a lengthened shadow of its founders or current dynamic leaders. The particular flippancy of Thomas Kiggen, one of the three founders, in not regularly removing his rotor blades for required inspections (with falsified maintenance records, no doubt), as well as apparently not attaching his safety belt illuminates the corporate arrogance of AG in general as the "market leader." If Kiggen so grotesquely cut safety corners on his own gyro, what does that betoken for AG in general?

Oh, and where is AG's "university study" on their Rotor System II's alleged 2,500 hour service life? I wonder if it ever existed at all.

AAIB current reports

You'll note that the investigation to G-CKYT from Nov 2020 is still under investigation and it would seem to me that the branch will be unlikely to be oblivious to these questions and indeed safety recommendations may well form part of the final report. In the UK the investigation due process includes a "consultation" period which is where affected parties have the opportunity to push back and for manufacturers commercial interest plays a part. The shambles around the EC225 in the North Sea is a nod to how that works for anyone interested.