Calidus Instructor Pack

I don't understand your question.

Please help me understand what you feel is the difference between "I would replace the rod ends" and "not airworthy."
I asked why you would have replaced them: because you didn't like them (although you thought them still airworthy), or because you thought them not airworthy.
Meaning, would your replacement have been elective (as a matter of personal taste), or (from an airworthiness concern) imperative?

_______
The FAA report, I will partially agree with you, was at least clunky. It contained some factual errors.
Mahler had owned the gyro for 3 months, not 3 years.
The "
full pitch" language was inept, probably (as WaspAir explained) due to using helicopter understanding.
The mast didn't fold at altitude, but during impact. Etc.

The narrative also mistakenly reordered the sequence of two key events: when the blades folded, and when parts came off.


Factual Information
HISTORY OF FLIGHT

Witnesses reported seeing the gyroplane take off on runway 35, turn left onto the crosswind leg, and climb to about 200 feet.
They "saw something fall" off the gyroplane, then the rotor blades folded, and the gyroplane crashed into a canal and sank.


However, this is not what the first witness reported in their statement. His sequence described the reverse:

I then watch the gyrocopter start a turn to the west (left). At that point the roto blades folded upward.
Pieces of the craft came off, the gyrocopter fell rapidly with slight forward motion . . .

The report's errors, however, are not material errors.
They do not invalidate the FAA's finding of a corroded-through control rod end, which broke in flight and not during impact.

And even if it hadn't broken that day, it was about to, and thus should have been replaced during the work by either Fritts or Brupbacher.
Remember, it wasn't mere surface corrosion; it was a fractured part with internal corrosion.


In my opinion with a fixed pitch semi rigid rotor when the rotor blades fold in flight it is typically because the rotor has slowed.
Yes, typically. But N5002E was not a typical crash.

Mahler was in an unremarkable climb, exhibiting no downdraft or loss of RRPM from any wind shear.
Still in that climb, he began to bank left. Climbing and banking, his rotor would have been adequately loaded.
It was at that point the compromised control rod end gave way.


In my opinion imagining a PPO won't happen because a pilot can anticipate turbulence and wind shear is dangerous.
Whoever claimed that?
It's statements like these that strike me as very odd.

All I wrote was that nobody flying that day reported any wind shear, and that Mahler would have stopped flying had he begun to experience it.

Regards,
Kolibri
 
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Kolibri;n1138772 said:
I asked why you would have replaced them: because you didn't like them (although you thought them still airworthy), or because you thought them not airworthy.
Meaning, would your replacement have been elective (as a matter of personal taste), or (from an airworthiness concern) imperative?

Regards,
Kolibri

It appears to me that we don't share the meaning of airworthy when applied to experimental aircraft.

I would not have flown the aircraft without addressing the issues I see with the rod ends in the picture you posted.

I would want to know how they became gouged and if they were binding.

That would likely involve replacing the rod ends because I don't know the history of how they were damaged.

Call that whatever you like.

I am not a certificated mechanic and it is not my place to pronounce your parts airworthy.

I don't determine airwhothyness of flight critical components from pictures.
 
Kolibri;n1138772 said:
The FAA report, I will partially agree with you, was at least clunky. It contained some factual errors.
Mahler had owned the gyro for 3 months, not 3 years.
The "[/COLOR]full pitch" language was inept, probably (as WaspAir explained) due to using helicopter understanding.
The mast didn't fold at altitude, but during impact. Etc.

The narrative also mistakenly reordered the sequence of two key events: when the blades folded, and when parts came off.


However, this is not what the first witness reported in their statement. His sequence described the reverse:

The report's errors, however, are not material errors.
They do not invalidate the FAA's finding of a corroded-through control rod end, which broke in flight and not during impact.

And even if it hadn't broken that day, it was about to, and thus should have been replaced during the work by either Fritts or Brupbacher.
Remember, it wasn't mere surface corrosion; it was a fractured part with internal corrosion.


Yes, typically. But N5002E was not a typical crash.

Mahler was in an unremarkable climb, exhibiting no downdraft or loss of RRPM from any wind shear.
Still in that climb, he began to bank left. Climbing and banking, his rotor would have been adequately loaded.
It was at that point the compromised control rod end gave way.



Whoever claimed that?
It's statements like these that strike me as very odd.

All I wrote was that nobody flying that day reported any wind shear, and that Mahler would have stopped flying had he begun to experience it.

Regards,
Kolibri

I am trying to understand your post with little success.

You say the NTSB report is flawed and yet it reads as through you are sure it is still correct.

You draw conclusions based on the facts that you admit are not facts.

I make a statement based on what you have written and you deny having indicated anything like that.

In my opinion some of the salient points and the lessons to be learned from this thread are:

None of us knows what happened with N5002E.

Based on many studies wind shear may not be predictable and it may not be possible to avoid it.

Clear air turbulence is often not visible or consistent.

Based on my experience it is possible to unload the rotor doing something no one sees.

In a high thrust line gyroplane one must be vigilant and ready to pull power at any time.

Rotor blades fold upward from low rotor rpm.

An aircraft that spends a day immersed in salt water will corrode quickly.

A thorough preflight before every flight is important for safe operation.

A careful annual condition inspection is important for safe flight.

The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

Please don't read anything into to the above and then disagree with what you imagined I wrote. I have mentioned all of these things in this thread.

I am trying to be helpful by putting them in one place so people who are interested can better understand what I have tried to communicate and skip your emotional diatribes.
 
I would not have flown the aircraft without addressing the issues I see with the rod ends in the picture you posted.
Well, then you'd have to take it up with the fellow who maintained and delivered my RAF in that condition: Dofin Fritts
That's at least two gyros that he sold with rod ends you'd have changed.

I replaced all my control rod ends as soon as I understood that I should. I originally went with Heims (pictured below),
and recently replaced them with high-misalignment Aurora CAM-6




RAF2000 safest bolt & washer for rod end scissors.jpg


You say the NTSB report is flawed and yet it reads as through you are sure it is still correct.
You draw conclusions based on the facts that you admit are not facts.
No, what I wrote was that the report correctly pointed to the in-flight separated control rod end.
Their material conclusion, I believe, remains sound.
The report's errors were not material.


An aircraft that spends a day immersed in salt water will corrode quickly.
Well, sure, but it cannot corrode the inside of a shank.
There was preexisting corrosion of that fractured rod end.
The investigator was quite clear about that, and this photo corroborates it.
Both of the broken rod ends had been in water for a day, yet the impact bent/broken on the left somehow avoided corrosion.



N5002E corroded control rod ends.jpg

Or, do you believe that no control rod end separated in flight?

Based on many studies wind shear may not be predictable and it may not be possible to avoid it.
Clear air turbulence is often not visible or consistent.
OK, but since no pilot at 1L0 had reported any, you seem to be relying upon a freakish singleton occurrence of it there.

A careful annual condition inspection is important for safe flight.
In your opinion, did seller Brupbacher perform a careful and honest annual inspection of N5002E?

Regard,
Kolibri
 
Kolibri;n1138796 said:
No, what I wrote was that the report correctly pointed to the in-flight separated control rod end.
Their material conclusion, I believe, remains sound.
The report's errors were not material.
You're not going to convince people by declaring gross inconsistencies in the "probable" cause as merely "not material".

Let me begin by saying I don't know what happened, but I do know that the investigator was utterly clueless about the way in which the rotor system worked. This is not a simple slip-up as to the pilot's age, or the airport identifier, or which day of the week it was. He described physical impossibilities for the structures at hand, treating them as if they were from a radically different design (for which he perhaps had some familiarity). Any errors so gross and so obvious as to the basic operation of the rotor system certainly disqualify the investigator from being relied upon and mark him incompetent, and that makes the errors pivotally material to the trustworthiness of all his conclusions. This investigator was the equivalent of a stopped clock, perhaps right twice a day by luck, but not to be trusted to tell the time, ever.
If I have read everything correctly (I have not invested much effort into to the nuances of this debate), you have picked out the sole conclusion that you like (inflight rod end failure), rejecting all others (mast failure in flight, pitch excursion, etc.). You're entitled to think so, but a probable cause determination known to be fully bogus is scant support for that opinion. Failure of a witness to report something that is difficult to see from the ground is also weak basis for concluding non-existence.
You might be right. But you might not. The certainty you profess is what puts off many readers here.

Now, as to inspection, operation, and maintenance practices, I think Vance gave us a pretty good list of lessons and best practices above that most will agree upon. Maybe we can make progress from there.
 
This should be been caught on an thorough annual inspection but I don't know any history of this machine.
TT about 200. Out of annual from 2009-2014, unflown, sitting in a humid New Orleans hangar.
Reconstituted for a quick sale in May 2014 by the seller and his broker/CFI.
RAF 200 Hour Inspections allegedly done, but evidently were not. Annual was a pro forma once over.
Purchased by a FW pilot, who trained with Fritts for about 25 hours, and the rod end failed 6 hours later.

I've personally looked over the wreckage and the flight and maintenance logbooks.



________
You're not going to convince people by declaring gross inconsistencies in the "probable" cause as merely "not material".
The report's probable cause was mechanical failure of the control system.
Even the lo-res photos of the rod end show internal corrosion of one broken rod end.
Other broken rod ends show no corrosion at all, but they should have in the "salt water for a day" theory.

Whatever errors the investigator made beyond his basic call are not material, if his basic call was correct.
I understand your skepticism of his acumen, but either that rod end failed in flight, or it did not.
Do you think it failed in flight?


Failure of a witness to report something that is difficult to see from the ground is also weak basis for concluding non-existence.
Perhaps it's weak, but it's still stronger than postulating something unable to be seen at all from the ground by pilots.

rejecting all others (mast failure in flight, pitch excursion, etc.)
At least I've not rejected them out of hand in this thread.
There is simply less (or no) evidence for the other theories, such as mast failure in flight, pitch excursion, wind shear, etc.

Before offering counter theories, let's first deal with the report's central conclusion: did a control rod end fail in flight?
Neither you nor Vance has answered that.

Regards,
Kolibri
 
Kolibri;n1138796 said:
Well, then you'd have to take it up with the fellow who maintained and delivered my RAF in that condition: Dofin Fritts
That's at least two gyros that he sold with rod ends you'd have changed.

I replaced all my control rod ends as soon as I understood that I should. I originally went with Heims (pictured below),
and recently replaced them with high-misalignment Aurora CAM-6








No, what I wrote was that the report correctly pointed to the in-flight separated control rod end.
Their material conclusion, I believe, remains sound.
The report's errors were not material.



Well, sure, but it cannot corrode the inside of a shank.
There was preexisting corrosion of that fractured rod end.
The investigator was quite clear about that, and this photo corroborates it.
Both of the broken rod ends had been in water for a day, yet the impact bent/broken on the left somehow avoided corrosion.





Or, do you believe that no control rod end separated in flight?


OK, but since no pilot at 1L0 had reported any, you seem to be relying upon a freakish singleton occurrence of it there.


In your opinion, did seller Brupbacher perform a careful and honest annual inspection of N5002E?

Regard,
Kolibri

I see that a carless or inept inspector felt the rod end failed in flight and was the probable cause.

In my opinion based on my experience wind shear is a common weather occurrence.

In my opinion denying that as the pilot of a high thrust line gyroplane or a fixed wing is dangerous.

Your question demonstrates a lack of understanding of condition inspections on experimental aircraft.

Things didn’t work out and people perished.

That does not indicate to me that the condition inspection was not careful and honest.

As I have previously stated I have seen more corroded rod ends on many gyroplanes that have had condition inspections by A&P mechanics and the cracks would have been difficult to find.

Chris Brupbacher is an amateur and the aircraft was amateur built.

The buyer knew that going in.

I have no way to know how careful or honest the annual condition inspection was.

When I purchased The Predator I paid an A&P mechanic with IA to show me how to do an annual condition inspection on her before I flew her.

I performed a weight and balance myself and paid another A&P to inspect her before I flew her because he had more experience with gyroplanes than the first A&P mechanic.

I purchased The Predator from a flight instructor and I found some things to repair.

The Predator is the first gyroplane I purchased.

I advise my clients to do the same.

I have found many potentially fatal mechanical issues just with a simple preflight on experimental amateur built gyroplanes including The Predator.
 
In my opinion based on my experience wind shear is a common weather occurrence.

In my opinion denying that as the pilot of a high thrust line gyroplane or a fixed wing is dangerous.
In my landings at some 120 airports in 26 states, wind shear is not what I would call "common".
I have experienced it in probably less than 10% of my landings.
Perhaps only in 1:20 ASOS reports I've heard included a wind shear caution, however, some airports are notorious for it.
This does not mean I recommend a flippant attitude about wind shear.

Now, crosswinds are what I would call "common".


____
You didn't comment on this, and I would like you to:
Even the lo-res photos of the rod end show internal corrosion of one broken rod end.
Other broken rod ends show no corrosion at all, but they should have in the "salt water for a day" theory.

____
I . . . paid another A&P to inspect her before I flew her . . . I advise my clients to do the same.

. . . I have seen more corroded rod ends on many gyroplanes that have had condition inspections by A&P mechanics and the cracks would have been difficult to find.
So, for N5002E an A&P not only would have likely missed the crack, but also approved the corroded rod ends, anyway.
(Now there is $90/hour well spent.)

Mahler was likely going to crash and die from that failing part, regardless of who inspected his gyro, but shame on Mahler for not hiring an A&P for his annual.

Yeah, right, I got it.

Having it both ways, you're at least consistent.



Things didn’t work out and people perished.
In my opinion, that kind of casual attitude helps to perpetuate low safety standards and apathetic behavior in the gyro community.

For example, Dofin Fritts should have been "run outta town" at least a decade ago.
What gyro maintenance of his is not shoddy is often fraudulent. His logbook signature is not to be trusted.
I have proven this on several occasions with photos from my own gyro.
In my opinion, he will continue his historical behavior, because it is tacitly tolerated by his peers.



_____________
Did that control rod end separate in flight?

There is an obvious reluctance by some here to speak up on this.

Ain't Gonna Go There.jpg
 
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Kolibri;n1138826 said:
... did a control rod end fail in flight?
Neither you nor Vance has answered that.
You're obviously not reading. My answer was clear and explicit
WaspAir;n1138823 said:
Let me begin by saying I don't know what happened...
What troubles me is that you seem to think that somehow you really do know, unequivocally, the sequence of events for a far-away incident, for which the official explanation is full of fantasy.
Some of us don't have access to absolute truth; even the errant investigator only deemed his conclusion a "probable" cause. That term was well-chosen by the authorities, who are almost never actually onboard at the time.
 
WaspAir, let's not quibble about epistemology, absolute knowledge, etc.

In your opinion, did that rod end fail in flight?
 
Kolibri;n1138864 said:
WaspAir, let's not quibble about epistemology, absolute knowledge, etc.

In your opinion, did that rod end fail in flight?

I'm not quibbling. It is not a matter of opinion. It is a factual matter, and I fully admit that I don't know the facts. I also assert that you don't, either.

Your refusal to take "I don't know" as a complete and valid answer (perhaps the one that reflects the most wisdom) is your personal issue.
 
He is always trying to deflect and start an argument ,I don't understand why he cant grasp the simple answer of

I don't know what happened
 
OK, I'll rephrase: I also "don't know" what happened but concur with the probable cause finding of the NTSB.

__________
I think that some here are getting too hung up on the report's downstream errors (full pitch, folding mast, etc.).

What if the NTSB report on N5002E had read this instead:



Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The failure of the flight control rod bearing due to an undetected preexisting corrosion-induced
crack, control continuity most likely was lost, and the rotor experienced a large uncommanded
cyclic input that caused it to stall on the retreating side and teeter down into the prop and tail.



Would some of you still be questioning probable cause that a) the rod end failed in flight, and b) that it resulted in the crash?

Regards,
Kolibri
 
Thank you Vance for your wise comments. When I purchased my 75 year old plane from an A&P, I took the time to do my own pre-buy inspection consisting of multiple pages of checklist items. Was I qualified? Maybe not but I had many many photos and instructions from other owners so I felt that I had done my absolute best. I even sent photos and called my mentor while I was there to confirm a couple of squaks. Then, I hired a ferry pilot to fly it to my home town service center and pay them to complete another annual even though it had a "fresh" one by the A&P seller. I was very lucky that the father of my A&P had worked in the factory and we even daydreamed that he may have had a part in building my plane. Pretty cool. Once that full annual was complete I felt comfortable taking passengers up after I logged approx 10 hours of flight time.

When I sold my first plane with 80 hours on it, I found a bill of sale on the EAA website that is two pages long of single page type. It basically said that the plane is experimental and is unsafe. It also said that it was amateur built and AS-IS. It was my way of making it absolutely clear that they should not trust me. I made the buyer sign it and also made his mom and dad read it. He was 17 years old. Guess what they did? They had me fly it 5 miles to the nearest A&P and they paid for an inspection. It passed with flying colors. After he paid for the plane I was asked to fly it to his home field about 2 hours away. I respectfully declined and he hired a CFI pilot who trains in that exact aircraft. He rode along and got some good pointers on the characteristics of that exact aircraft. Smart kid. He went on to go to Embry.

Am I accusing the owner of anything? No. Am I accusing the seller of anything? No. However, whether purchasing a car or an aircraft, it seemed to me to be common sense to do a pre-buy and time in a shop. I do feel bad for the people killed but we all MUST take pilot in command seriously. Those innocent souls that fly with you expect you to take their safety seriously. There has been more than one occasion that I have declined to take a passenger up because I didn't feel good. There have been many times I have pushed my plane back into the hangar due to a final weather decision. Planes crash and people die every year in Tahoe. It is very unforgiving. When I flew with Vance he made two weather decisions, one before we took off and one while I was at the controls. I understood his reasoning despite my intense desire to fly over the beaches I had visited for five years while in college.

Thank you again Vance for your voice of reason. Some people simply cannot grasp the concept of responsibility for ones actions (or in-actions) and it seems to be an ever increasing aspect of our culture that I find very disappointing.
 
Kolibri;n1138901 said:
OK, I'll rephrase: I also "don't know" what happened but concur with the probable cause finding of the NTSB.

__________
I think that some here are getting too hung up on the report's downstream errors (full pitch, folding mast, etc.).

What if the NTSB report on N5002E had read this instead:



Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The failure of the flight control rod bearing due to an undetected preexisting corrosion-induced
crack, control continuity most likely was lost, and the rotor experienced a large uncommanded
cyclic input that caused it to stall on the retreating side and teeter down into the prop and tail.



Would some of you still be questioning probable cause that a) the rod end failed in flight, and b) that it resulted in the crash?

Regards,
Kolibri

Yes; in my opinion your version is not credible and does not fit the definition of probable cause.

I am clear that I don't know what happened.

In my opinion the control rod end either broke in flight or on impact; I simply don’t know.

In my opinion the value of the report and the discussion is to think about such things, imagine the possibilities and learn how to be safer pilots.

I feel condemning or blaming someone detracts from the process.

Please just give it a rest.
 
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HighAltitude;n1138903 said:
Thank you Vance for your wise comments. When I purchased my 75 year old plane from an A&P, I took the time to do my own pre-buy inspection consisting of multiple pages of checklist items. Was I qualified? Maybe not but I had many many photos and instructions from other owners so I felt that I had done my absolute best. I even sent photos and called my mentor while I was there to confirm a couple of squaks. Then, I hired a ferry pilot to fly it to my home town service center and pay them to complete another annual even though it had a "fresh" one by the A&P seller. I was very lucky that the father of my A&P had worked in the factory and we even daydreamed that he may have had a part in building my plane. Pretty cool. Once that full annual was complete I felt comfortable taking passengers up after I logged approx 10 hours of flight time.

When I sold my first plane with 80 hours on it, I found a bill of sale on the EAA website that is two pages long of single page type. It basically said that the plane is experimental and is unsafe. It also said that it was amateur built and AS-IS. It was my way of making it absolutely clear that they should not trust me. I made the buyer sign it and also made his mom and dad read it. He was 17 years old. Guess what they did? They had me fly it 5 miles to the nearest A&P and they paid for an inspection. It passed with flying colors. After he paid for the plane I was asked to fly it to his home field about 2 hours away. I respectfully declined and he hired a CFI pilot who trains in that exact aircraft. He rode along and got some good pointers on the characteristics of that exact aircraft. Smart kid. He went on to go to Embry.

Am I accusing the owner of anything? No. Am I accusing the seller of anything? No. However, whether purchasing a car or an aircraft, it seemed to me to be common sense to do a pre-buy and time in a shop. I do feel bad for the people killed but we all MUST take pilot in command seriously. Those innocent souls that fly with you expect you to take their safety seriously. There has been more than one occasion that I have declined to take a passenger up because I didn't feel good. There have been many times I have pushed my plane back into the hangar due to a final weather decision. Planes crash and people die every year in Tahoe. It is very unforgiving. When I flew with Vance he made two weather decisions, one before we took off and one while I was at the controls. I understood his reasoning despite my intense desire to fly over the beaches I had visited for five years while in college.

Thank you again Vance for your voice of reason. Some people simply cannot grasp the concept of responsibility for ones actions (or in-actions) and it seems to be an ever increasing aspect of our culture that I find very disappointing.

Nicely reasoned and written Tim.

You nicely stepped around the snarky pontifications and offered some useful advice based on reality and experience.
 
I have made a decision to refrain from responding to a certain member. Members and visitors have a well documented alternative viewpoint in all the various threads.
 
However, whether purchasing a car or an aircraft, it seemed to me to be common sense to do a pre-buy and time in a shop.
In effect, that's what Darren Mahler thought he was doing when, according to the newspaper he had N5002E trailered to Brewton, AL for an inspection by an RAF expert.
Had Fritts done honest work on N5002E, then Mahler wouldn't have risked his life with compromised control system parts.

Taking a gyro to the average FW A&P probably isn't going to be entirely effective, as they don't know gyros, and certainly not RAFs.
Vance then had the astonishing (and perhaps unintended) gall to blame Mahler for not having a thorough bre-buy from an A&P would have likely missed the compromised part.


Am I accusing the owner of anything? No. Am I accusing the seller of anything? No.
Echoes of the teacher from the student . . .


_________
Yes; in my opinion your version is not credible and does not fit the definition of probable cause.
Well, Vance, that's interesting because it was not my own version.

I merely inserted Doug Riley's N5002E comment after the NTSB's "
due to an undetected preexisting corrosion-induced crack".
But you knows better.


In my opinion the value of the report and the discussion is to think about such things, imagine the possibilities and learn how to be safer pilots.
Yeah? What do you imagine the next RAF newbie can learn from what you've contributed to this discussion?
That he should take his potential RAF purchase to an A&P, who will likely not replace a corroded (and cracked) control rod end?
That his broker CFI who should have done so in accordance with RAF's 200 Hour Inspection won't be held accountable?
That everyone preceding him in the safety chain will fail him, yet the gyro community will nonetheless lay this in his lap because he was PIC on the last flight?


I feel condemning or blaming someone detracts from the process,
I don't, if that someone were actually culpable.

Had Dofin Fritts actually performed -- as he signed off that he did -- RAF's 200 Hour Inspection (which includes replacing all the control rod ends),
then Darren Mahler would not have died that day.


Had Chris Brupbacher actually performed an annual inspection in the scope and detail required by Part 43, Appendix D, he would have at least removed
any visibly corroded control rod ends for inspection. In an annual inspection, things are taken apart, removed, and looked over. Brupbacher avoided doing so.
It was a sham sign-off.


In my opinion the control rod end either broke in flight or on impact; I simply don’t know.
That's not an opinion at all, like saying that X event either happened at night or during the day. It's just mush, and typical of you.

Back in October 2014 you at least admitted that RAF's parts "
appeared to me to be poor quality spherical rod ends" but today you argue with me the opposite.

Back in 2011 about Dofin Fritts you remarked "
In my opinion an instructor who has an unusually high number of dead students has a creditably [sic] challenge and it is very relevant to any saftey discussion." Today, however, you excoriate me for my "vendetta" against Fritts for his students comprising 40% of the dead RAF pilots.

You have by now consistently shown a bizarre pattern of disagreeing with yourself in order to disagree with me.

You "
don't know" what happened to N5002E? In my opinion you don't want to know, else you'd have a responsibility to act upon that knowledge.

What I am objecting to, and what I have objected to since Oct 2014, is that newbie gyro owners be held to higher standards than gyro CFIs who broker junky used aircraft.

I have proven that Dofin Fritts rubberstamps maintenance logbooks of gyros not his own, and that people have relied upon his signature to their severe detriment.
Nobody here seems to give a sh*t, and yet some marvel that I'm "
snarky" about it?

Well, I'm tired of the fork-tongued, double-standards treatment I've experienced here.
I've decided to do something about it to protect myself on this forum.

I will become a Gyro CFI.

Kolibri
 
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In my opinion based on my experience a good A&P mechanic can do a good annual condition.

Not all A&P mechanics are good so some care must be taken in choosing the best one.

If you live in the USA go on the NTSB website and read about gyroplane accidents and think about what may have happened and what you can do to keep from becoming an NTSB report. Be aware that often the people writing the report may not be technically astute about gyroplanes.

For those with poor reading comprehension a brief summary:

I don't know what happened.

I don't know when the control rod end broke and it may not have been the cause of the accident.

Despite what some people claim wind affects gyroplanes and the weather can be radically different just ten miles away. What you feel on the ground may not be what you will experience 500 feet above the ground. I am at El Mirage dry lake and the winds are out of the west at about seven knots. At Sothern California Logistics (VCV) just 11 miles to the east winds are 150 degrees at 23kts gusting to 37kts.

The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

Mahler was not authorized to take passengers.

Sometimes things just go wrong no matter how careful we are.

Some pilots don't understand the most basic concepts and pretend they do.

Flying experimental amateur built gyroplanes is dangerous and requires vigilance and effort to mitigate that risk.

Good training reduces the risk but does not eliminate it.
 
I should clarify my case. I took four days off from work and participated in the first annual of my new 75 year old plane. When I took it back for a new brake system, I was there again helping. If an service shop will not let you work along side the certified mechanic, you have the wrong shop. It wasn't a matter of trust for me. It was a matter of learning my aircraft. There is no substitute to BUILDING your own aircraft. I look forward to building my kit in December and knowing every nut and bolt on it. Builder's assist improves you odds of long term success. Look at the $4000 to $5000 cost as money well spent on learning all about your aircraft. Do not pay anyone else do do any of the builder's assist without you present. You are giving up a golden opportunity. Make time, spend the money to travel, and take as long as it takes you at your pace.
 
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