Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Calidus Instructor Pack

Collapse
X
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • I really like the Way he tells us exactly now it is,no exceptions,he acts like his word is the only and final answer of everything.


    and how dare we question him,my god have we no sense of who we are questioning.

    Best Regards,
    Eddie Sigman,Polvadera,nm
    (575) 835-4921

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post
      fara, how many ADs and SBs do Mooney, Cessna, Piper, Beech, etc. blame on the pilots improperly storing or flying the aircraft?

      ...

      Probably none. But how many ADs and SBs from us, AutoGyro or ELA have you seen that blame the pilots in the documents?
      I honestly haven't seen all the ones from AutoGyro or ELA etc. but I know we have not blamed any pilot for the couple of mandatory ADs we have released and the ones I have seen from others have not to the best of my knowledge.

      Kolibri: I do not think you are all wrong on all your points. You talk about problems with RAF. I have no comment because I don't know or have not looked at RAF closely enough to be qualified to counter your points. I know RAF does not have a HS and I would stay clear of that but that's my opinion. You may be completely right about their issues. I am not knowledgeable enough about that design to comment on construction methods they used. Same for Dofin Fritts. I don't know.

      You talk about points about ELA that Mike Goodrich brought up. I have no problem with those specific points. Mike G presented specific examples, specific problems with technical details usually much beyond a normal end user envelope because he has obvious background in engineering. His points were specific with examples and made in such a way that its hard to argue at least for me. I have not much to add than what Mike G has already pointed out. The data is there for anyone to see.

      Its when you take a welding and composite issue that is specific to ELA and only after a certain date of production and start to generalize it to all Stainless Steel masts or take an issue which happened to AirCopter rotors that MTO used and start to generalize it is where I have issue with your approach. Those problems are happening due to specific reasons. I don't want to go into details of why those specific problems happened because each is a full discussion on its own but your conclusion that oh its because its made from Stainless Steel for example is completely wrong. If your conclusion was correct why ELA masts did not fail and only the tail booms are cracking. Per your analysis the masts are critical and have more vibration and should have cracked first then, right? Why did ELA's made in early days do not have this issue so far? Obviously its more than your simplistic approach and thinking. That is what I am trying to object to.

      In terms of do SD and ADs blame the pilot. Like I said I am not aware of any that do but sometimes honestly the pilots are to blame. Just recently in ASTM Design and Specification standard for airplanes, there has been a work item for vapor lock prevention. The background for it is as follows

      "Rationale
      During a recent F37 LSA task group meeting at EAA AirVenture 2018, a discussion was led by members of the FAA Small Airplane Standards Branch. This discussion centered around two recent SLSA incidents in March 2018 due to loss of engine power, both of which were attributed to vapor lock. One of them resulted in an accident where both the pilot and passenger sustained serious injuries. It was further discovered that both aircraft were unknowingly fueled with a winter automotive gasoline (autogas, or mogas) blend when the Outside Air Temperature (OAT) was approximately 80° Fahrenheit. Upon review of the details surrounding the incidents, it was revealed that F2245 has no requirement for consideration of operating environment related to fuel, or more specifically maximum fuel vapor pressure that can be experienced in the field, to ensure that the engine functions properly when installed on an SLSA in all likely operating conditions. It was the consensus of this task group to add a requirement to section 7.3 Fuel System of F2245 to better define the requirement to prevent vapor lock and define a fuel on which to show worst-case scenario compliance, rather than having to test a myriad of various fuel blends."

      These users used 3 or 4 month old auto fuel from winter formulation in the summer and because of hot weather had vapor lock happen. Most POH and specifically these aircraft POH specify to not use fuel more than 3 weeks old so whose fault is it? Even so, in the standard now the manufacturers have to do specific testing to the following proposal

      "7.3.1 The fuel system must be free from vapor lock when using an aircraft manufacturer-approved fuel at its critical temperature,6 with respect to vapor formation, when operating the aircraft in all approved operating conditions.

      NOTE 10—If the airplane is intended to be approved for use with automotive gasoline (autogas, or mogas), either containing ethanol or ethanol-free, compliance with this section must be demonstrated on the highest vapor pressure autogas likely to be experienced in the field. Autogas is governed by ASTM D4814 in the US and by EN228 throughout Europe and other parts of the world. Compliance with this section, with respect to autogas, is then shown when the aircraft fuel system can demonstrate successful operation free from vapor lock while using a Class E-6 blend autogas according to D4814 with a vapor pressure minimum of 103 kPa (15.0 psi); or a Class F blend according to EN228, with a minimum vapour pressure of 100 kPa (14.5 psi).7 These are the high limits for vapor pressure of each of their respective standards. Autogas shall not be listed as approved on the airplane unless demonstration according to this section can be achieved on either of the above prescribed fuels. if successful compliance is shown with autogas using either of the above blends, avgas (either leaded as defined in D910 and/or unleaded as defined in D7547) may be added to the aircraft’s approved fuels without further demonstration.

      NOTE 11—If the airplane is intended to be approved solely for use with an ASTM-approved avgas specification, either leaded (e.g. ASTM D910) or unleaded (e.g. ASTM D7547), compliance with this section, with respect to avgas, is then shown when the aircraft fuel system can demonstrate successful operation free from vapor lock while using a blend with a vapor pressure minimum of 49.0 kPa (7.1 psi). If successful compliance is shown with the 49.0 kPa avgas blend, avgas, either leaded or unleaded, may be added to the aircraft’s approved fuels; this compliance showing does not, however, allow for autogas to be added to the aircraft’s approved fuels without further testing, as outlined in Note 10."

      Increasing compliance burden and cost when the simple prevention was don't fly with auto gas stored for multiple months. Its going to cost every new airplane buyer more because someone has to pay for all that testing manufacturers will have to do.

      I also don't buy the comments that simply using A&Ps is the answer for perfect maintenance. There are plenty of A&Ps who can't think one step ahead of themselves. There are plenty of lawsuits against maintenance shops at fault. Yes likely that the chances of mistakes are less than if an amateur is doing it I guess but by no means perfect. In the end when you go buy a used aircraft you better know what you need to be doing or have someone who knows and not rely on the other party. Otherwise stick with new aircraft purchase. You as pilot in command are responsible for declaring the aircraft airworthy and that is eventually the bottom line.

      Comment


      • But how many ADs and SBs from us, AutoGyro or ELA have you seen that blame the pilots in the documents?
        fara, my photo was a composite of screenshots from the factories own SBs, generally blaming the pilots for improper flying.
        Read them for yourself.


        Why did ELA's made in early days do not have this issue so far? Obviously its more than your simplistic approach and thinking. That is what I am trying to object to.
        Yes, I get that, but I'm not trying to explain everything through simplistic or overgeneralized argument.
        Rather, I am trying to encourage owners and potential customers to understand the multi-generational derivation of gyro design,
        and that some materials and construction methods are not necessarily ideal, and perhaps more risky than they comprehend.



        ___________
        What is it about left turns or 200' that makes a PIO or PPO impossible?
        WaspAir, while I didn't claim impossibility, the two reports by witnesses (apparently pilots, since they watched from their hangar)
        describe a normal takeoff, 1000' of ground effect flying, and then an unremarkable climb to 200-300' followed by an unremarkable left bank.
        There was no hint of any zoom climbing, porpoising, power pushover, or hard banking.
        Their reports, coupled with the preexisting fracture/corrosion of at least one control rod end, points to an in-flight mechanical failure as the FAA concluded.


        Let's be fair here.
        Cessna and its peers do not have to deal with assembly, maintenance, inspection, and even modification by rank amateurs
        Yes, point taken, but let's also not hand out hall passes to gyro kit factories who reflexively and falsely blame their customers.
        In my example with RAF, ELA, and AG -- all three were soon proven to be the factories' poor design, material, or procedure.



        ___________
        You know, eddie, back in Nov. 2015 when you first saw my N5002E photos, you sensibly posted the below.
        What's happened to you during the past three years?


        After looking at the above picture,all I can say is O-MY-GOD,there is corrosion and then there is that.I can't believe any body would sign that kind of corosion off in a inspection as air-worthy,there's no way that should have been allowed to fly with that kind of damage.
        I have seen airplanes from that flood and others,examination of the inside of the aircraft will show the aluminium has also corroded it looks like a white powder coating the surface,I suspect that the insides of the airframe itself is very badly corroded also.

        A couple more hard landings and the whole gyro could have folded up, in my opinion.

        With corrosion that bad showing on the surface,the gyro should have been taken out of service. Again thats just my opinion.

        If that was one of the parts inspected then it looks like there is a problem with the inspection/inspector,
        if he missed that piece.I really wouldn't run that on my lawn mower.

        ___________
        If he viewed the wreckage sometime after the aircraft had spent the day under water I would expect there to be a lot of corrosion.
        From Kolibri's posts it appears this has not occurred to him despite me mentioning it several times. The introduction of reality only seems to escalate his rhetoric.
        Ah, well, what clearly has not occurred to Vance is that his theory requires a day under water to have caused MORE corrosion than
        many years of flying
        "in all sorts of weather" (according to the seller), and then 5 years of languishing in a dank New Orleans hangar.

        My theory, however, is much more credible: that the fracture and corrosion necessary to fatally compromise that particular rod end was already
        present at the time of the Fritts/Brupbacher "inspection"/annual of 14 May 2014. My theory also conforms with Occam's Razor, and also aligns with the
        notorious deception of Fritts and his maintenance logbook notations (such as my own RAF's mast bushing and rotorhead bolts inspection).


        I would have replaced the rod ends and hardware for corrosion.
        Oh, Vance would have, but it was simultaneously acceptable that Fritts did not?

        The FAA's photo which Vance posted in #141 is of a mast scissor (the broken one).


        Click image for larger version  Name:	Photo 4 - Corroded Flight Control Bearing Stub.png Views:	1 Size:	491.7 KB ID:	1138464


        On the intact rod end, much surface corrosion is easily visible, and it's clearly old enough to have predated the crash.
        Did a day under water possibly accelerate the corrosion? Sure, but not enough to have caused 100% of it.
        Point being: the 4 scissors control rod ends are at about 5'4" high on the mast.
        These were no lower control yoke rod ends just inches off the ground,
        but eye level corrosion staring Fritts in the face for weeks, yet he ignored it.

        For CFI/broker/mechanic Fritts or seller/repairman Brupbacher to have been theoretically culpable for the crash of N5002E,
        two elements must exist:


        1) a dereliction of responsibility to have inspected and replaced corroded control rod ends (either from apparent condition, RAF's insistence, or general prudence).

        2) their extreme carelessness -- or explicit deception -- regarding logbook entries of RAF Hourly Inspections and FAR 43 - Appendix D for annual inspections.

        In short, not to have performed a duty is bad enough, but it then compounds the omission to falsely claim or imply that it had been performed.
        Certifications under signature are supposed to mean something, as others are banking their very lives on that logbook ink.
        However, if we cannot routinely trust others, then we'd all better become A&Ps and conduct our own 100 hour annual inspections.

        Both Fritts and Brupbacher avoided their responsibility, yet by signing the logbook falsely claimed to have performed responsibly since both RAF's 200 Hour/12 Month Inspection and
        FAR 43 - Appendix D (Scope and Detail of Items to be Included in Annual and 100 Hour Inspections) compelled their replacement (due to age and/or condition).


        (c) Each person performing an annual or 100-hour inspection shall inspect (where applicable) the following components of the cabin and cockpit group:
        (7) All systems—for improper installation, poor general condition, apparent and obvious defects, and insecurity of attachment.
        He blames the builder for not finding something very difficult to find
        A crack without corresponding visible surface corrosion would have been difficult to find or suspect.
        However, that was not the case here since nearly all eight control rod ends had varying and unacceptable degrees of visible corrosion.
        Any marginally prudent and responsible owner or CFI would have replaced them while reconstituting a gyro that had been rusting unflown for five years in a Gulf Coast hangar.
        N5002E was sold and delivered in a nonairworthy condition, because of greed, apathy, and laziness.


        and the broker for believing the seller.
        Broker Fritts didn't "believe the seller".
        Rather, Fritts pencil-whipped the logbook as having performed all the needed hourly inspections, when he clearly did not do so.
        He similarly lied in my RAF logbook before I purchased it, as I've proven several times on this forum.


        I find it more telling that he blames the flight instructor for an accident that he believes was not caused by the pilot.
        While Fritts was training Mahler in N5002E, Fritts was PIC. (Mahler's logbooks indicate that.)
        From 17 May 2014 until Mahler's 2 August solo, all the training pre-flight inspections were on Fritts.

        Is anybody here actually alleging that the control rod ends were sound and airworthy parts until 2 August, and then one of them
        magically fractured and corroded badly during Mahler's PIC flying until the accident of 21 September?


        I find it more telling that Vance stubbornly protects and absolves Dofin Fritts of his patently fraudulent maintenance logbook entry, and his shameful apathy for his student's safety.

        Perhaps Tim is right and he is an inept personal injury attorney hoping to find a jury moved by his emotional rhetoric unconcerned with the impact of the cost of litigation.
        Vance may continue to fantasize about my motives, in direct conflict to what I wrote on 08-16-2015, 12:28 PM in post 254 of that thread:

        Not being a litigious sort, and generally disdaining personal injury attorneys, I nonetheless certainly see merits to Ms. King's suit against Brupbacher and Fritts. It [is] the furthest thing from a "too-hot coffee in the lap" complaint. Photos of the corroded control rod ends (which also seemed past their 250 hours mandatory replacement per RAF) show that N5002E indeed suffered from lack of proper inspection and maintenance.

        This accident was not even close to being caused by some fluky mechanical failure that was difficult to foresee (e.g., a bad AN12 bolt in the hub bar). In such neglected condition, IMO this gyro should not have been flown at all. (How it passed muster in Brewton is utterly beyond me.) It definitely should not have been sold to a gyro newbie, who, after Fritts's inspection, relied upon it to immediately begin his training.

        Whatever level of maintenance ignorance one may ascribe to Mahler during his 3 month ownership of N5002E, such does not begin to approach the negligence of the seller and CFI. Regarding Mahler in all this, a poignant line of Shakespeare's King Lear seems fitting:


        . . . a man
        More sinn'd against than sinning
        .
        I still stand behind my post of three years ago.

        And when current gyro pilots and even CFIs continue to dismiss any notion of irresponsibility by Dofin Fritts and Chris Brupbacher,
        they unknowingly participate in the posthumous
        "sinn'd against " of Daren Mahler.

        With that said, perhaps some here will better understand my passion on the matter.

        It's our gyro community, Folks.
        Crap gyros like N5002E sold by crap owners through crap brokers jeopardizes others, especially newbies.
        We'll continue to get what we tolerate.

        Regards,
        Kolibri
        Last edited by Kolibri; 09-19-2018, 09:52 AM.
        PP - ASEL complex (C172RG, Piper 180, C206, RV-7A), SP - Gyro (Calidus, RAF, SC2), soloed in gliders

        "
        When an honest but mistaken man learns of his error, he either ceases to be mistaken -- or he ceases to be honest."

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post
          fara, my photo was a composite of screenshots from the factories own SBs, generally blaming the pilots for improper flying.
          Read them for yourself.



          Yes, I get that, but I'm not trying to explain everything through simplistic or overgeneralized argument.
          Rather, I am trying to encourage owners and potential customers to understand the multi-generational derivation of gyro design,
          and that some materials and construction methods are not necessarily ideal, and perhaps more risky than they comprehend.



          ___________

          Regards,
          Kolibri[/COLOR]
          Hi Kolibri:

          I went back and saw your post with the picture that you talk about. Besides RAF, the others clearly started by saying we are not yet sure of the cause and it could be because of X Y Z. Companies want to release a SD as soon as they can to advise customers of problems. It is true that at such a stage that is in the interest of safety and the cause truly may not be clear at that point. There is no abnormal behavior or malice I see there. You are reading way too much into it.

          Also by your thinking we would all be flying wooden airplanes still. or tube and fabric (cotton) planes at best. That is not how things work. Things move forward. There would be no composites in airplanes if we followed your mantra for manufacturing.

          Then you might say never buy the Titanium gyro because its welding requires the most care and special process. We are making aircraft and the quality of the people and processes doing special processes like brazing, welding, heat treatment etc. matters. Not any joe shmoe should be used for aircraft structural welding. Structural welders in the welding industry for example have no business welding thin wall aircraft tubing or sheet. They are the worst at it. Welding special process definition should be followed by the welder. It specifies things like back gas or flux purge, full penetration or partial penetration welds in different areas. These are determined in production design engineering. Welder's job is to weld to that special process definition spec. Some welders don't follow such guidance. They cannot work in aircraft manufacturing environment. You make this way too simple minded and way too generalized. Stick with specifics with examples, show a pattern, show expert views on the specific patterned examples and then you will not get push back from the likes of me. I have had problems like this with welders. We had production of trikes that used Exhaust from a reputable supplier approved welding station by UK CAA. After 39 sets, starting on set 40 we received and on wards every exhaust starting cracking on every machine in less than 40 hours. Went on for 15 units till I changed suppliers completely. The vendor swore no process had changed, no QC had changed. Obviously something had. We had to eat replacements and change the vendor. So for the SD, you'd blame us that we did not check exhausts sufficiently or that we used stainless steel exhausts and that was the issue because the problem did not occur before or after. The problem obviously was lack of process control at the vendor after a certain batch.

          Like someone advised me on this thread ... I am probably wasting my time. Oh well ... I just hope I have made my point for you and others to see and evaluate overall

          Last edited by fara; 09-19-2018, 06:54 PM.

          Comment


          • After 3 years and finding about the accident through other sources than your rants,and ravings,I have changed my mind after reading what

            really happened

            Why did you change your mind about the Sportcoptor Blades and how you were having problems with them,I looked for your posts and found

            you have deleted them.
            Best Regards,
            Eddie Sigman,Polvadera,nm
            (575) 835-4921

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post
              WaspAir, while I didn't claim impossibility, the two reports by witnesses (apparently pilots, since they watched from their hangar)
              describe a normal takeoff, 1000' of ground effect flying, and then an unremarkable climb to 200-300' followed by an unremarkable left bank.
              There was no hint of any zoom climbing, porpoising, power pushover, or hard banking.
              Their reports, coupled with the preexisting fracture/corrosion of at least one control rod end, points to an in-flight mechanical failure as the FAA concluded.

              Regards,
              Kolibri[/COLOR]
              The reports by witness's read exactly like a power push over to me.

              In my opinion the damage to the aircraft fits a power push over.


              I have had pilots on the ground not recognize pilot induced oscillation when I am training.


              In my opinion I do not need to do a zoom climb or porpoise to have a power push over.


              In my opinion hard banking does not cause a power push over.
              Regards, Vance Breese Gyroplane CFI http://www.breeseaircraft.com/

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post

                Ah, well, what clearly has not occurred to Vance is that his theory requires a day under water to have caused MORE corrosion than
                many years of flying
                "in all sorts of weather" (according to the seller), and then 5 years of languishing in a dank New Orleans hangar.

                My theory, however, is much more credible: that the fracture and corrosion necessary to fatally compromise that particular rod end was already
                present at the time of the Fritts/Brupbacher "inspection"/annual of 14 May 2014. My theory also conforms with Occam's Razor, and also aligns with the
                notorious deception of Fritts and his maintenance logbook notations (such as my own RAF's mast bushing and rotorhead bolts inspection).

                Regards,
                Kolibri[/COLOR]
                I have done corrosion testing where we measured the formation of corrosion and in my opinion based on my experience hauling something out of salt water after a day allows the water to get in everywhere and dramatically accelerates corrosion.

                As I have written before I have seen many aircraft with much more corrosion on the rod ends. It just makes Dofin not replacing the rod ends typical of the care experimental amateur built aircraft get. I have seen many certified fixed wing aircraft with worse corrosion in their wing spar.

                It was a mistake and someone paid for it with their lives. That doesn't make Dofin the monster you portray. I am certain he feels bad about it.

                In my opinion the crack would have been very difficult to spot and the rod end failed because someone adjusted it badly. Dofin felt it was safe because he flew the aircraft.
                Regards, Vance Breese Gyroplane CFI http://www.breeseaircraft.com/

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post

                  Is anybody here actually alleging that the control rod ends were sound and airworthy parts until 2 August, and then one of them
                  magically fractured and corroded badly during Mahler's PIC flying until the accident of 21 September? [/COLOR]

                  I find it more telling that Vance stubbornly protects and absolves Dofin Fritts of his patently fraudulent maintenance logbook entry, and his shameful apathy for his student's safety.

                  And when current gyro pilots and even CFIs continue to dismiss any notion of irresponsibility by Dofin Fritts and Chris Brupbacher,
                  they unknowingly participate in the posthumous
                  "sinn'd against " of Daren Mahler.

                  Regards,
                  Kolibri

                  I have consistently written that I don't know enough about Dofin’s mechanical work to have an opinion. I am not a mechanic and don't pretend to be. I take log book entries seriously and yet I have seen many A&Ps who don't.

                  I have not even defended Dofin as a CFI other than to write that he is not responsible for everything you blame him for and he is not the monster you make him out to be.

                  I can't help it if you don't have good reading comprehension.

                  I decided not to take lessons from him so what does that say?

                  I know some very good gyroplane pilots that he trained.

                  I look at the accidents that his students have had and don't believe they are all his fault.

                  There are several DPEs and CFIs who have signed off Dofin's students. Are they incompetent too?

                  I don't dismiss any notion of responsibility for Dofin and Chris and this is another example of your emotion driven rhetoric.

                  I also assign responsibility to the pilot in command for taking a passenger along when he was not allowed to and not doing a more thorough preflight.

                  I feel that Dofin is not responsible for Kolibri's lack of understanding despite being his flight instructor.
                  Last edited by Vance; 09-19-2018, 03:22 PM.
                  Regards, Vance Breese Gyroplane CFI http://www.breeseaircraft.com/

                  Comment



                  • kolibri said that,

                    "The failed rod end was on the lower control yoke." The photo you posted was of the mast scissors.[/COLOR]



                    In post #153 he states that "there are no lower control yoke rodends just inches off the ground",and yet there they are just inches off the ground,

                    also note that to inspect the rodends correctly you will have to get down on the ground to see them.






                    Best Regards,
                    Eddie Sigman,Polvadera,nm
                    (575) 835-4921

                    Comment


                    • and the cause truly may not be clear at that point. There is no abnormal behavior or malice I see there. You are reading way too much into it.
                      fara, then they should have simply stated that the cause of the part failure was unclear, instead of also automatically blaming the pilots.
                      I was pointing out a common thread of
                      "It's not our fault!" management philosophy amongst some gyro kit mfg.

                      Also by your thinking we would all be flying wooden airplanes still. or tube and fabric (cotton) planes at best. That is not how things work. Things move forward. There would be no composites in airplanes if we followed your mantra for manufacturing.
                      Talk about reading way too much into something!
                      I'm all for the incorporation of modern materials and processes, IF they are sufficiently tested before reaching the market.
                      On that point, I think that carbon-fiber rotor blades could rightfully become the preferred material, especially for heavier blades 30+ feet in diameter.


                      We are making aircraft and the quality of the people and processes doing special processes like brazing, welding, heat treatment etc. matters. Not any joe shmoe should be used for aircraft structural welding.
                      Yes, I agree, but you still did allow six of the earliest AR-1 gyros to go out with those lousy looking mast welds.
                      You had that improved subsequently -- bravo.
                      Also, you Silverlight seems to take more care in their welding than does AutoGyro or ELA, so again, bravo.


                      Stick with specifics with examples, show a pattern, show expert views on the specific patterned examples and then you will not get push back from the likes of me.
                      By the time there is a "pattern" many gyros will have crashed and people hurt and killed.
                      I'd rather head off the palpable chance of a pattern emerging at all.

                      You and I (and others) disagree on the appropriateness of using 304 stainless for the mast.
                      You claim that AutoGyro's 2017 Calidus SB on (stainless steel) mast plate cracking is due to their welds.
                      In part, I would agree, but you ignore the fact that AG also mentions the mast plates themselves, not just the welds.
                      I continue to believe that the stainless steel itself is part of their problem. I hope that it never becomes one of yours
                      .


                      _______________
                      The reports by witness's read exactly like a power push over to me.

                      In my opinion the damage to the aircraft fits a power push over.
                      Vance, is it your contention that no control rod end separated in flight, causing an uncommanded rotor and consequential crash?
                      I.e., that the control system was intact in the air, but the pilot somehow allowed reduced rotor thrust while maintaining power and caused a PPO?
                      That all the broken control rod ends were broken upon impact?
                      That is your theory?



                      As I have written before I have seen many aircraft with much more corrosion on the rod ends.
                      It just makes Dofin not replacing the rod ends typical of the care experimental amateur built aircraft get.
                      And that is acceptable behavior by a CFI who brokers used RAF gyros?
                      Cui tacit consentire. (He who is silent, consents.)


                      It was a mistake and someone paid for it with their lives. That doesn't make Dofin the monster you portray. I am certain he feels bad about it.
                      I never called him a "monster" as that would betoken actual willfulness for the crash.
                      I called him greedy, lazy, and apathetic. I did not call him evil.
                      I'm sure he feels bad about the two deaths, but I doubt that he feels any personal responsibility.

                      He opined to the widow's attorney that had the rod end separated on him in flight, he'd have simply glided in a spiral to a safe landing.
                      This is either a shocking ignorance of gyros for somebody of his experience, or a desperate psychological defense mechanism to duck his own culpability.


                      In my opinion the crack would have been very difficult to spot
                      You're still acting as if no surface corrosion existed to raise concern about the part. Some did, and right along the jam nut/shank junction.
                      You're also still trying to dump all of this on poor preflighting, and ignoring the rubberstamped maintenance logbook by Fritts and Brupbacher.


                      and the rod end failed because someone adjusted it badly.
                      That wasn't Mahler, since the fracture and internal corrosion had preceded his purchase.
                      So, that leaves either Brupbacher or Fritts -- neither one of them showing any due diligence for their signed off work.
                      Fritts did not satisfy the RAF Inspections, and Brupbacher did not perform an honest annual inspection as required by FAR 43 - Appendix D.


                      Dofin felt it was safe because he flew the aircraft.
                      Yes, he flew the aircraft with Mahler for some 25 hours.
                      Yet, neither Dofin Fritts nor Brupbacher bothered to spend even one hour removing the eight control rod ends for inspection even though visible condition compelled it.
                      If they had, they'd have found the cracked one.
                      Dofin has become lazy with his gyro maintenance, and is arrogant enough to fly in them. It finally killed two people.


                      I have consistently written that I don't know enough about Dofin’s mechanical work to have an opinion.
                      Take off your blindfold, then, and look at the condition of N5002E vs. his maintenance logbook entry.
                      (You already stated that you didn't like the condition of his aircraft, which you personally saw.)

                      Furthermore, having purchased an RAF which Dofin Fritts worked on frequently, I do know enough about his mechanical work.
                      He logbook entries were often enough lies, pure and simple. Here is a prime example:


                      Click image for larger version  Name:	Dofin Fritts on RAF maintenance inspections.jpg Views:	1 Size:	301.9 KB ID:	1138516



                      I have not even defended Dofin as a CFI other than to write that he is not responsible for everything you blame him for
                      You've never had him responsible for ANY of this, not even when he was CFI/PIC for bad preflighting.
                      Cui tacit consentire. (He who is silent, consents.)


                      I don't dismiss any notion of responsibility for Dofin and Chris . . .
                      You don't assign any to them, either. Rather, you place it all on Mahler:

                      I also assign responsibility to the pilot in command for taking a passenger along when he was not allowed to . . .
                      I agree, Mahler was wrong for taking up passengers. (As a PP-ASEL, he may have been confused about that, though.)

                      . . . and not doing a more thorough preflight.
                      While Dofin Fritts was training Mahler, Fritts was the PIC and thus in charge of pre-flighting.
                      I have copies of Mahler's flight logbook. They had 20 sessions together.
                      Meaning, Fritts as PIC had 20 pre-flights (or opportunities thereof).

                      Mahler, once he soloed and was PIC, had just 7 flight sessions.

                      Yet you absolve Fritts for not finding (before 20 flight sessions) a "crack [that] would have been very difficult to spot" .
                      But then you turn around and blame Mahler for not finding the same crack before his mere 7 flight sessions.

                      Thus, we again arrive at your typical double-standards for newbie PICs vs. their CFIs.
                      Your professional loyalty is noted. Even lazy and apathetic CFIs such as Dofin Fritts are safe with you.



                      _______________
                      After 3 years and finding about the accident through other sources than your rants,and ravings,I have changed my mind after reading what really happened
                      Ha, well, eddie, even if you believe another probable cause for the crash, would you now fly an RAF with such corrosion of N5002E?

                      And what "
                      other sources"? The FAA's report concludes that a control rod end separated in flight, causing the crash.

                      In post #153 he states that "there are no lower control yoke rodends just inches off the ground",and yet there they are just inches off the ground
                      Since I own an RAF, and know that they are just inches off the ground, this was obviously a typo. Geez.
                      I meant to write "they are no lower control yoke rod ends".


                      Why did you change your mind about the Sportcoptor Blades and how you were having problems with them,I looked for your posts and found you have deleted them.
                      You are utterly mistaken. I've never had "problems" with my Sport Rotors, and they've been a complete joy.

                      The only issue I've ever had was during the installation, with some hiccups and snags that I thought Sport Copter could improve upon.
                      Those few comments/suggestions remain
                      here and nothing has ever been deleted.

                      Regards, Kolibri
                      Last edited by Kolibri; 09-20-2018, 09:40 AM.
                      PP - ASEL complex (C172RG, Piper 180, C206, RV-7A), SP - Gyro (Calidus, RAF, SC2), soloed in gliders

                      "
                      When an honest but mistaken man learns of his error, he either ceases to be mistaken -- or he ceases to be honest."

                      Comment


                      • And two more examples from my RAF on the quality and reliability of mechanical work by Dofin Fritts.
                        I managed to catch it all in time, before it killed me off, too.


                        Click image for larger version

Name:	Dofin Fritts RAF construction for convenience vs. safety.jpg
Views:	1
Size:	221.9 KB
ID:	1138519


                        Click image for larger version

Name:	Dofin Fritts version of RAF2000 rubber mast bushing.jpg
Views:	1
Size:	139.5 KB
ID:	1138520
                        PP - ASEL complex (C172RG, Piper 180, C206, RV-7A), SP - Gyro (Calidus, RAF, SC2), soloed in gliders

                        "
                        When an honest but mistaken man learns of his error, he either ceases to be mistaken -- or he ceases to be honest."

                        Comment


                        • What's especially heartbreaking about this crash is that Mahler did not benefit from the freakishly good timing of two other RAFs (G-____ and ZU-RHO)
                          which crashed only a few feet after takeoff. Such timing saved the lives of 4 people. Had N5002E's rod end failed just after takeoff, Mahler and Wilt may have survived.
                          Tragically, however, the rod end handled a few extra seconds of control input, enough for N5002E to reach a fatal altitude for failure.

                          I harped on control rod end replacement a few years back, and I'll mention it again now:
                          PLEASE inspect at least the three outside lower control yoke rod ends (two are 3/8 and one is 1/4).
                          They take a lot of ground handling shock, and are in the worst of elements.

                          PLEASE take a mere hour of your time to at least remove them for careful scrutiny.
                          (I'll wager that you'll find corrosion on the shank that it otherwise invisible from a pre-flight. I did.)

                          For the price of an average lunch, you can replace them with Auroras.
                          For any paupers among us, PM me your name and address and I'll buy them for you with your promise of immediate installation.

                          During your preflight, PLEASE use a flashlight and hand mirror to carefully inspect your lower control yoke and its rod ends.

                          Safe flying,
                          Kolibri
                          PP - ASEL complex (C172RG, Piper 180, C206, RV-7A), SP - Gyro (Calidus, RAF, SC2), soloed in gliders

                          "
                          When an honest but mistaken man learns of his error, he either ceases to be mistaken -- or he ceases to be honest."

                          Comment


                          • Its just amazing that he can absolutely say that the rodend broke and caused the crash,even the FAA said probably,leaving open the

                            chance that they are mistaken,But not the kolibri, his word is final without exception.

                            And now he is telling us how to preflight and inspect our own machines,what a guy.

                            He is way better than Ralph Nader.
                            Best Regards,
                            Eddie Sigman,Polvadera,nm
                            (575) 835-4921

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post
                              Vance, is it your contention that no control rod end separated in flight, causing an uncommanded rotor and consequential crash?
                              I.e., that the control system was intact in the air, but the pilot somehow allowed reduced rotor thrust while maintaining power and caused a PPO?
                              That all the broken control rod ends were broken upon impact?
                              That is your theory?

                              Regards, Kolibri[/COLOR]
                              My contention is that I don't know what happened.

                              In my opinion to rule out a power push over for the reasons stated demonstrates a lack of understanding about power pushovers.

                              Regards, Vance Breese Gyroplane CFI http://www.breeseaircraft.com/

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Kolibri View Post
                                You're still acting as if no surface corrosion existed to raise concern about the part. Some did, and right along the jam nut/shank junction.
                                You're also still trying to dump all of this on poor preflighting, and ignoring the rubberstamped maintenance logbook by Fritts and Brupbacher.


                                Regards, Kolibri[/COLOR]
                                You make things up faster than I can respond.

                                I have been clear there was surface corrosion and the NTSB is clear there was surface corrosion.

                                What part of that don't you understand?

                                There are mechanics I respect who would not have replaced the rod ends for corrosion in the pictures I posted.

                                I am not trying to "dump all this" on anything or anyone.

                                You are the one pretending to have the answers and placing blame.

                                You are escalating your emotional rhetoric that is unrelated to my posts.

                                I see no reason to give you more words to misunderstand.

                                A good friend of mine sent me an email about Kolibri saying simply; "DON'T FEED THE TROLL."

                                I feel that is good advice.
                                Regards, Vance Breese Gyroplane CFI http://www.breeseaircraft.com/

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X