Carter Copter Crash, Cause

[PW_Plack]

The EAA is reporting that the most recent crash of the Carter Copter was not caused by the uncommanded engagement of the pre-rotator in flight, as was first reported. Details here:

EAA Report (http://www.eaa.org/communications/eaanews/050707_cartercopter.html)

[rtfm]

Hi,
I was struck by the use of the term "autogyro" in the report you pointed us to. Yes, I know that nomenclature in the gyro world isn't exactly precise or consistent oftentimes, but "autogyros" is more often than not used to refer to tractor gyros. Dare we hope for a Tractor Gyro (TG) from Carter Copter? :)

Duncan

[birdy]

The gyro is inherantly the safest low n slow aircraft ever built.

[Brent_Brown]

I am happy they are going to put this stuff on a gyro that we might see get scaled down to the point a $30,000 price tag.

[mceagle]

It was good to see this report and the real cause of the accident. I am always suspicious of accidents blamed on "prerotator becoming engaged in flight", often a red herring to draw the attentation away from pilot error.
In this case, a lesser pilot may not have saved two lives.

[Vance]

I am trying to understand the dynamics. The drive bolts sheer thrust stops and the aircraft slows form 160 miles per hour to stall? If it was a fixed wing with small wings, I would think that you decend to maintain airspeed and land? Have they expanded the height velocity curve? I must not understand how the Carter Copter flies. I thought that the wings took over above a certain speed and unloaded the rotor, then they slow the rotor and esentialy fly as a fixed wing with a high wing loading. I don't understand the rapid change in velocity just because thrust stops. I would be gratefull for help in understanding the process. What makes it slow? At two thousand feet I would think that they could trade altitude to maintain air speed? I would think at that speed that there was some choice in where to land? I am not trying to second the people who were there, I am trying to understand how an unconventinal aircraft respondings to a conventional challenge. Thank you, Vance

[Rotor-Head]

I am trying to understand the dynamics. The drive bolts sheer thrust stops and the aircraft slows form 160 miles per hour to stall? If it was a fixed wing with small wings, I would think that you decend to maintain airspeed and land? Have they expanded the height velocity curve? I must not understand how the Carter Copter flies. I thought that the wings took over above a certain speed and unloaded the rotor, then they slow the rotor and esentialy fly as a fixed wing with a high wing loading. I don't understand the rapid change in velocity just because thrust stops. I would be gratefull for help in understanding the process. What makes it slow? At two thousand feet I would think that they could trade altitude to maintain air speed? I would think at that speed that there was some choice in where to land? I am not trying to second the people who were there, I am trying to understand how an unconventinal aircraft respondings to a conventional challenge. Thank you, Vance

Great question Vance.

[Udi]

Vance - I agree. This report makes me think the chain of events was not completely due to bad luck. Sounds like a combination of bad engineering (bolts sheering off in flight) and a pilot error (stalling the wings). If I were Larry and Brad I would say goodbye to this project. I think the powers that be gave them plenty of warnings and second chances.

Udi

[Vance]

Hello Ehud, I am not making any acusation, only trying to reconcile the report with my understanding of how the Carter Copter flies. I would like to understand what happened and so far, I am confused. thank you, Vance

[Luc De Keyser]

Vance and Udi,

I believe most of the newsreport makes sense and answers most of Vance's questions. Although I have no serious qualifications, this is how I read it: The craft went from maximum thrust to negative thrust (the latter I take to mean the propeller acting at least like a passive airbrake and possibly like an active airbrake with the blades at a negative pitch. pls refer to Carter propeller designs). Lift was provided mostly by the fixed wing at that time. The deceleration was so fast that the rotor did not have time to spin up to pick up the lift quickly lost by the fixed wing. Furthermore, I suppose the pilots got instructions not to change the attitude of the craft suddenly when the rotor is off loaded and at low rpm. Thus, the craft lost control authority and banked to the left in a steep descent. The gain of airspeed and the resulting increase in rotor rpm gave back some control authority. The question not answered is why the hard stick right would sever the left cyclic boost control link. In any case, this prevented the pilots to seek out a good landing spot because all they could do is slow down a descending spiral and get the craft level on touch down.

So they did trade in height for speed but needed time (high inertia) to get the rotor up to speed. Without left cyclic boost control link they could not aim for a better landing spot and avoid the brush. Stalling the wing thus was not a pilot error. In these situations, it is not the speed over wing that one should count on, but on autorotative recovery. And that is exactly what the pilot did.

How many and how severe incidents have to be to call off a R&D activity in general aviation is for more qualified to address.

Any other reads?

Luc

[PW_Plack]

Vance,

I suspect this is one of those occasions in which the compromises between the two types of aircraft left them without the best features of either. I'd bet the stall speed of the Carter Copter when flying on its stubby fixed wings is pretty high, maybe close to 100 MPH, and it's probably more prone than a Cessna to enter a spin if you stall it.

With its very heavy depeleted-uranium rotor tip weights, the Carter Copter reportedly has enough rotor inertia to do two back-to-back jump takeoffs without re-engaging the prerotator. The downside of all that rotor inertia is that it may take hundreds or thousands of feet of vertical descent to reload the slowed rotor in an emergency.

From 3,000 feet with stalled wings, there might not have been time to reload the rotor in a straight vertical fall, and there may not have been enough control authority to attain the correct attitide for such a maneuver. Diving to gain airspeed and unstall the fixed-wings, then flaring at 100+ MPH into a patch of Mesquite trees, might also have been a poor choice.

To me, this is the scariest aspect of so-called "flying cars" which are supposed to be in our future. If they're not very good aircraft, and not very good cars, they may become a tool of Darwin in the hands of today's careless motorists.

[rtfm]

If I were Larry and Brad I would say goodbye to this project. I think the powers that be gave them plenty of warnings and second chances.
Udi
Hi. Udi, I've got to say I'm a little surprised by your eagerness to ditch the single most promising technological project in the gyro (and possibly the entire rotor) world at the moment. Say goodbye to the promise of 350kt gyro flight? What, just walk away from it? Surely the better option is to start again, build a new CC, and incorporate the lessons learned so far. They've just broken the Mu barrier - and you'd just say goodbye to it? Surely not...

Duncan

[Mayfield]

I suspect the boys at CC are working pretty hard to understand what happened.

I hope that their onboard data collection and telemetry will help.

We, on the other hand, have only the initial pilot report to work with.

That being the case, I ask myself what rotary wing phenomenon will cause an un-commanded pitch down and roll into the retreating blade?

Well, I can’t think of anything that precisely fits. Generally, in retreating blade stall, because of how the blades are flapping, the roll is into the retreating side but the pitch excursion is nose up.

That being said, I believe it is reasonable to expect that, during the incident flight, Larry and Brad were continuing to explore high-speed flight with low RRPM. Since the flight at Mu-1 that morning was for only 20 seconds or so, how close were they to some type of “mouse trap” or “toggle over” event?

Did they toggle over during the incident flight?

With the data available to us, I do not know if we will ever learn precisely what happened.

I am very happy that Larry and Brad walked away. Some back channel comm tells me that Brad did some pretty heroic stuff after the aircraft stopped moving.

Like Udi, I am concerned about how many potentially serious accidents/incidents have plagued this test program. I think we should all be cognizant of just how close to a double fatal this one was.

R/S

Jim

[Vance]

Thank you Jim, That is part of what confuses me, I would think that if the nose piched down that the thrust they lost when the drive bolts sheared would be replaced by the decent and airspeed would not drop off so quickly. It is hard for me to understand why they would not fly like a draggy fixed wing with a high stall speed.

I try to imagine how the blades would get back up to speed after the retreating blade stalls. Wouldn't there be a lot of drag trying to prevent the rotor from accelerating? Wouldn't there be control confusion between the wings and the rotor? I remember that in Helicopter training I was often told that a rotor blade stall was a non recoverable event.

It would seem to me that given how high they were and how fast they were going that they were well within the height velocity curve of any helicopter and most fixed wings.

I have spent some time on Carter Copter's web site and I don't believe that I understand the quest for "breaking the MU barrier". I would like to understand why this is important. I apoligize for my ignorance. I have watched the Carter Copter fly and land and it apears to me that there is a certain amount of aerodynamic confusion between the wings and the rotor. I saw considerable movement in the wings that seemed to be in time with the rotor.

I would like everyone to realize that just because I don't understand it does not mean that I condem it. More than once I have been involved in projects that had trouble achieving their goals and pursuing the understanding was the most exciting part. My motorcycle streamliner crashed every year for four years and I learned a great deal each year.

Thank you, Vance

[Udi]

My posts may not be PC enough but I am starting to feel that any test pilot who agrees to place themselves inside this test bed is taking a risk not un-similar to the risk taken by early generation astronauts. This, obviously, is their choice - I just said that I would have quitted. My life is more precious to me (and my family) than ANY advancement in rotorcraft technology. The number of accidents/incident this project has seen is totally unacceptable in my mind. Weren't wind tunnels invented for this purpose? Are the lives of test pilots cheaper than a few hours in a wind tunnel?

Sorry for not being more PC but the obvious lack of respect for safety pisses me off.

Udi

[Cobra Doc]

Jim;
I can think of ony one scenario: they stalled the advancing blade AND the wings. An advancing blade stall would be nose down and roll the oppsite direction. With the wings stalled things would get ugly from there.

[GyroRon]

Udi don't feel alone.... I would walk away from it too if I were a CC test pilot! That thing could or is going to kill someone at some point.

[Brad_King]

I will not go on record disputing the official line. With any accident it is hard to determine an exact cause by looking at the pieces without spending resources which are unavailable. The wing on this aircraft stalls below 150 mph. We were at 150 mph and 150 rrpm when the incident began. We were nowhere near the the limits we reached on the previous flight. 170 mph and 107 rrpm. The aircraft was stable and performing as expected. There was some disagreement between those involved concerning the actual sequence of events. The main drive pully bolts shearing were the cause of the sequence of events. The result was a pitch link boost cylinder becoming inoperable. We had 66 sec from the beginning of the incident to impact. If you put the cyclic full right and the aircraft continues turns left the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft. I will not allow anyone to call pilot error in this accident unchallenged. I will say I don't know of any other aircraft in existence that could land at 80+mph in a mesquite thicket and have the pilots walk away with NO injuries. Given that result, it is indisputable that Larry did exactly what needed to be done exactly when it needed to to be done and the CarterCopter proved itself to be one of the most crash worthy aircraft there ever was.


Respectfully,
Brad King
CoPilot
N121CC

[Dean_Dolph]

Whoa, wait a minute guys! If there were no one willing to test, or get excited about testing new and/or innovative aircraft where do you think aviation would be today or go tomorrow. If there hadn't been a Chuck Yeager, a Scott Crossfield or a Joe Walker, or a Juan De La Cierva or an Igor Bensen, all test pilots of sorts with the right stuff, where do you think our various aviation endeavors would be at the moment?

Larry and Brad are very experienced pilots who I don't know well at all. But never have I seen or heard anything like a death wish mentioned when their names come up. You are insulting them by even thinking that they have involved themselves with out knowing what they are getting into or by suggesting that they haven't done their homework. Maybe one guy might make that mistake but two? Nah! We rapidly come to conclusions on RAF incidents (yes, even me!) because of what we have come to accept. But as far as I know there isn't anyone that has posted here but Brad that understands the CC test program and all the details and safeguards.

I don't trust reports from third parties very much so anything that has happened this time or in the past is subject to question as far as I'm concerned. We can enjoy the sport of speculation all we want but lets not fall into the trap of questioning people's intelligence or integrity. This is a unique aircraft and for all we know it may exhibit unique characteristics where what applied in the past isn't necessarily a fit in this case. And while no one would have purposely set up a test program to check the survivibility of the CC, this last flight probably did provide some useful data. Let us all hope that the project recovers and moves forward. You never know what fall out may benefit us all.

[Udi]

Brad - I apologize for jumping to conclusions based on limited information. I am glad you came here to give a first hand account and set the record straight. Good luck with all future flights.
Udi

[Heron]

Looking forward is always better, lots of data and tests to be considered and the new start can be very promising.
Our guys are still here and as far as I know they would jump right back in and do it again!
Been test pilot is not a job one takes lightly, they ponder all the situations before saying yes . . .
Some applause is in order!
Thanks
Heron

[Rotornut]

Brad, Thanks for the post. Tell Diane we all say Hello.
Thanks for making it over to BD Days it was good to visit with you and Diane again.
Take Care and
Hope to see you both again soon. Take Care MJ :)

[Chuck_Ellsworth]

To the crew at Carter Copter, having had the privelage of working with the Airbus test pilots at the factory in Toulouse France for two summers I know the stress and dangers inherent in test flying.

You have my respect and admiration for having the courage to explore unknown areas of the flight envelope in your hybrid test platform....

...all the best and I hope you are sucessful in your project and that that will be the last of your bad luck.

Chuck E.

[Mayfield]

Whoa yourself Dean.

I have read this thread very carefully and I see no denigration of Larry or Brad.

I do see evidence of concern for a couple of our own folks. I think this concern is well advised. There are some pretty bright people perusing this forum and none of them is sniping at Carter.

Carter’s flight test program has been plagued for years with structural failures.

Carter seems to often report that “we had this great flight, and then at the end we had this little crash.” There have been a lot of reports like that Dean.

In the early years the accidents occurred while flying in ground effect or during the landing phase of flight. Generally the energy levels are low and there is some horizontal vector to help with the deceleration.

This most recent accident occurred at a few thousand feet, and as stated by the co-pilot, turned the pilot into a passenger.

(“If you put the cyclic full right and the aircraft continues turns left the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft.” – Brad King, 11 July, 2005)

Energy levels are much higher in this part of the envelope. The stakes are life and death.

I have also done a little testing over the years Dean. Nothing makes your blood run cold so quickly as an un-commanded excursion.

I am quite familiar with Larry and Brad. I issued their Private Pilot Gyroplane rating a few years back. They are both great sticks and very level headed. Neither I, nor anyone else in this thread, have evidenced any feelings except respect, admiration, and concern for Larry and Brad.

As far as the great test pilots you mentioned, I only personally know Scott and General Yeager. Notwithstanding the movies, both Scott and the general are coldly analytical when it comes to testing. They plan the flight and they fly the plan. I have no reason to assume that Larry and Brad do less.

I have seen no indication that Larry and Brad made any errors. And, although they did not die or become seriously injured, I offer a paraphrase of the quote attributed to Jay Carter: “You should not have to crash when you are doing everything right.”

A quote from the Carter web site:

“During a subsequent flight, the pilots executed a forced landing in a nearby field. The pilots walked away from the landing unharmed, but the aircraft sustained significant damage.”

Isn’t calling this event a forced landing something like saying the Titanic sprung a leak?

I hope I have not offended you Dean. But, I believe you censured a bunch of folks that asked good questions, are searching for the truth, and gave good, heartfelt advice.

I also must remark that when reading Brad's excellent post the most prominent message is that he and Larry did not "screw the pooch. This, by definition means that there was some type of failure beyond their control.

R/S

Jim Mayfield

[Cobra Doc]

Brad;
Best of luck in the future.

[WindRyder06]

Way to go Jim!!! I am glad my friends Larry and Brad were able to walk away from this. I know how they both took the aircraft (the CC) serious when they jumped in the cockpit. It was all business over the radio. Jim it is too bad that Carter's funding was placed in front of my friends lives........

Fly Safe,
Chris

[Dean_Dolph]

Whoa yourself Dean.

I have read this thread very carefully and I see no denigration of Larry or Brad. Okay, maybe I read something into what has been said that wasn't there. Maybe...maybe not!I do see evidence of concern for a couple of our own folks. I think this concern is well advised.....There have been a lot of reports like that Dean.Yeah, I'm aware of the reports. I suspect that you have info conduits that the rest of us don't have so I certainly wouldn't attempt to dispute what you say about their program; especially since I'm in the dark as much as anyone else. And of course everyone is concerned
......I have also done a little testing over the years Dean. Nothing makes your blood run cold so quickly as an un-commanded excursion.I'll bet it does! I suspect one gets a little cotton mouthed followed by a sour taste!As far as the great test pilots you mentioned, I only personally know Scott and General Yeager. Notwithstanding the movies, both Scott and the general are coldly analytical when it comes to testing. They plan the flight and they fly the plan. I have no reason to assume that Larry and Brad do less. I can't say I know any test pilots. The closest I have been is a friend of mine that was an instrumentation technologist on the X-15. Whether his stories about Scott and Joe Walker are completely true or embellished, they are good stories. But, from what he told me, Joe Walker was being true to form when he collided with the XB-70.......I hope I have not offended you Dean. But, I believe you censured a bunch of folks that asked good questions, are searching for the truth, and gave good, heartfelt advice.Nah, no offense taken. (Dean says as he sobs) If I didn't have a thick skin when I started visiting the internet; I wouldn't have survived Craig Wall's questioning my intelligence, not that there is any to question!

Jim, asking good questions, searching for the truth and etc. is fine and like I said speculation is a good sport. But I took some of what was said, to be a questioning of Carter Copter's test program as far as safety was concerned. You may know how they test but if any one else does they haven't commented or supplied the details where they believe there is a weakness.

In my mind, by questioning the safety of the program and suggesting that Larry and Brad walk away, people are saying that they aren't capable of assessing the situation. We also had a mention or two of pilot error which Brad took exception too. And rightly so since the quote by Brad that you refer to indicates that the pilot couldn't make an error because he had no control and had become a passenger.

I understand people making those comments. It is something that we do when we have been frightened, like when I use to yell at my kids at the worst possible time after they did something that could have turned out very badly. I was scared for them and felt bad for yelling afterwards. I see evidence in the case that there is an understanding that saying less would have been best.

In any case, we are all glad they survived the incident.

[PW_Plack]

It's important to remember, there's a difference between the way these things work at NASA versus the civilian world. The guys at Scaled Composites went to space and back on $20 million, but also endured an episode involving 19 uncommanded rolls in a row on one flight. They didn't quit.

On the other hand, the US Space Shuttle's record suggests that massive budgets just move the in-flight failures off into other categories.

[Udi]

... But I took some of what was said, to be a questioning of Carter Copter's test program as far as safety was concerned. You may know how they test but if any one else does they haven't commented or supplied the details where they believe there is a weakness.

In my mind, by questioning the safety of the program and suggesting that Larry and Brad walk away, people are saying that they aren't capable of assessing the situation. We also had a mention or two of pilot error which Brad took exception too. And rightly so since the quote by Brad that you refer to indicates that the pilot couldn't make an error because he had no control and had become a passenger...
Dean – I may have jumped to premature conclusions with regard to pilot errors (based on the "official" line), but I still believe the poor track record of this program to date, with regard to safety, is an indication of a very serious underlying problem.

I am a chemical engineer, Dean. I know you have worked with people like me, so I think this analogy will speak to you. When I design a new process, the operators of this new process don’t check my calculations. The operators also don't check that the contractor has installed the high-pressure lines per-spec or that all the bolts were torqued to spec. The operators have to "assume" that the engineers did their job, that the contractors did their job, and that a system of checks and balances was implemented to verify that everything was done to assure safe operation. If the engineer hasn't done his job properly, or the contractor hasn't done his job properly, and there were no systems in place (HAZOP, SOPs, system commissioning, etc.) to verify safety - who is going to get injured, or worse, when a pipe or vessel blows up? The operators! As the principle engineer, Dean, I feel a heavy weight of responsibility sitting on my shoulders. People’s lives are in my hands.

Same thing with test pilots. Test pilots have to trust the engineers, the builders, and the systems that are implemented to verify safety. I am sure that Jim can give a two-hour lecture on how all this works in aviation, I can only draw analogies from my field.

Naturally, there is risk inherent to testing of a new aviation technology. Adding on top of this the additional risk of in-flight structural failures (due to negligence, may I add) is -- IN MY OPINION -- not acceptable. If the pilots cannot trust the designers, the engineers, the builders, and the system of checks and balances, they should not strap their precious little butts to this aircraft. Jim, would you agree?

Me, having this opinion, takes nothing away from Larry and Brad. I am worried for their safety and I hope that maybe, if they read this discussion, they will pause and re-assess the risk they are taking.

Very respectfully to all test pilots,

Udi
p.s. I just wanted to add that I have not audited the CC program and I have no specific knowledge of safety issues. My impressions are based strictly on what I perceive as a high accident ratio. I apologize if my interpretation of the facts is in error.

[Mayfield]

Udi,

As is often the case you made the point better than I did.

Although, as demanded by the FARs, the pilot in command is responsible for determining the airworthiness status of an aircraft, there are sobering realities.

Dean indicated that it is insulting, to Larry and Brad, for many of us to recommend that they walk away from the CC project. The rationale is that Larry and Brad have made informed decisions.

Larry and Brad are good pilots. They have chosen to become test pilots. I do not believe they should be responsible for determining shear strength of the propeller drive bolts.

One or two others intimated that it is inevitable, during testing of innovative technologies, to have accidents/incidents.

The problem is that many, if not most, of the accidents/incidents have been structural/mechanical/electrical failures.

If the propeller bolts shearing were the proximate cause of this last accident, why did they shear? We are at a point in the art and science of engineering where we should be capable of correctly sizing aircraft components.

I believe with all my heart that we came close to loosing these fine men through what is described, by Carter, as a structural failure.

How about the in-flight fire? Is there anyone here that believes that the in-flight fire incident did not come perilously close to taking Larry and Brad from us? When you look at the photos of the cowling provided by Carter a couple of things jump out. First Carter says that the fire warning sensors did not detect the fire because they were in the top of the cowling. Then he displays a photo captioned “inside of top engine cowling.” The photo shows severe fire damage.

How about the gear up landing in 2003? Carter has repeatedly touted his tail boom design as being able to preclude damage if the aircraft is landed gear up. In this incident, Carter reported, on his web page, that the structure was ground away until the fuel tank (fortunately empty) skins were compromised. Carter’s report: “The bottom of the wing/fuselage was ground off to the fuel tank. Had we not located a separate fuel tank for testing in the very strong pressurized cabin, we could have had a major fire.”

And then there is the exploding spinner caused, according to Carter by the failure of a mounting bracket. This is another case where we could have lost the pilots.

I do not want this to become a diatribe. The bottom line is that most of these life-threatening incidents are not related to the core goal of the CC program. They are engineering failures. Sizing bolts, brackets, structural members, etc. is cookbook engineering. At this stage in our human progress, life threatening structural failures should not occur. Larry and Brad should be able to concentrate on envelope expansion while having a reasonable expectation that their aircraft will hold together long enough to bring them home.

Now to the crux; Are Larry and Brad qualified to assess the structural integrity of the test article? No, they are not. They should not have to be. It is the responsibility of engineering to ensure an adequate design and the responsibility of the safety department to ensure that the design is fabricated, and maintained to specification.

Larry and Brad must trust that engineering, and other support organizations, do their job. Trust is earned and maintained by demonstrable actions.

So in closing I will say it straight out: Larry and Brad should punch out of the program. There are simply too many incidents where their test article let them down.

R/S

Jim Mayfield

[PTKay]

I was carefully following the CC project with great hope for success.

But all the time I was wondering, why to h... do they experiment
on ALL at the same time.

Couldn't they just take a certified engine, certified prop, all possible certified
elements and concentrate on testing one thing at a time !
The rotor for example...

Trying to develop at the same time new engine, propeller, rotor, fuselage,
wings is plain weird to me.

I think it's partly due to lack of funding, but this is no excuse.

I still wish them all the best, but they really should first test
their revolutionary prop on the monarch, before puting it on CC again.

Just my 2 cents.... ;)

[Vance]

Speaking of their revolutionary prop, I was trying to understand from their website how it would pitch if the prop stoped going around, like in the recent incident. I didn't see how it would operate in the convential way. Is there something built into the computer for a stoped prop? It sounded as though it would go to a flatter pitch untill the prop reached it's pre-programed speed. If it was not driven I would think that it would decrease its pitch till it got up to the preprogramed rpm. I would think that this would create a lot of drag. I would be gratefull if someone would explain how it works. It certainly looks kool. thank you, Vance

[mceagle]

Harsh words Jim but seemingly very true. The stated failures relate to engineering requirements that are already known - why stretch the unknown. Forum gossip is only that, but if what we hear is correct, there would appear to be some weakness in the engineering department.

[PW_Plack]

Forget rumors. You can reach this conclusion even if all you have to go on are the NTSB reports.

A test pilot sizes up the project before the first flight, and makes a decision that he will trust the engineers. He knows there is a chance he'll be mistaken in his assessment, and he should have an open mind to reconsider. IMHO, somewhere along the way to five crashes involving serious damage to the aircraft, I'd have reconsidered.

[Dean_Dolph]

Okay, Udi, now you have done the unforgivable. You reminded me that I used to work for a living! Actually I don't think it is work if you enjoy it and I did. However, I told them as much as I enjoyed my job I would quit showing up if they quit sending me my check. Guess what?!! Downsized '99!

Udi, you are correct on all counts. You too, Jim, as far as people that are responsible for executing the game plan should be able to depend on the coaches or what ever.

You people were addressing that side of it while I got caught up in my perceptions. Sorry 'bout that!

Udi, I performed a lot of the same work you do but since I wasn't carrying the papers I wasn't paid accordingly. Then again sometimes I had to rely on others on the team to do the calcs and bless my efforts. But I still was the one that had primary responsibility for safety both in design, testing, commissioning and the training on new systems. I'm talking about R&D scale as opposed the the scale that I imagine you deal with. It wasn't bench scale however.

So, yes, there is a lot of responsibility that goes along with these types of jobs. And yes, there were times, over a 25+ R&D career plus another 15 in operations before that, that I sweated out new start ups. When you deal with new processes/techniques there are numerous opportunities to screw up. And there is no guarantee that all the checks and balances in place are all that are needed. Sometimes you, or no one else knows, what you don't know. Fortunately I only had one incident that while not resulting in anything super serious, it had the potential to be, if nothing else, very expensive. On the other hand before the days when preop teams, with third party assistance, performed an evaluation, I participated in a number of post incident investigations and it was scary seeing the number of obvious things that were overlooked or not questioned.

We know Brad has been visiting us so maybe Larry and he will revisit the situation. It appears that CC needs a unbiased third party evaluation of their entire operation. If they don't have the funds for such an evaluation then they need to think seriously about shelving the project until they do.

Just wanted to add that when I mentioned Joe Walker and the XB-70 that I wasn't taking a shot at his professionalism or his competence. The story teller commented that it just seemed that every time Joe had a camera on him that bad things happened. There was more than just the XB-70 incident and I heard the stories before that incident.

[Brad_King]

They add an update on the CC website.


http://www.cartercopters.com/



Brad King
Co Pilot
N121CC

[Udi]

I applaud Carter’s decision to suspend the development of the CCTD. I hope they continue development when (and if) they have the resources to DO IT RIGHT.

Udi